

JPRS 77844

16 April 1981

# China Report

POLITICAL, SOCIOLOGICAL AND MILITARY AFFAIRS

No. 182



FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE

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# CHINA REPORT

## POLITICAL, SOCIOLOGICAL AND MILITARY AFFAIRS

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## PARTY AND STATE

### 'GUANGZHOU RIBAO' ON UNANIMITY WITH CENTRAL COMMITTEE

Guangzhou GUANGZHOU RIBAO in Chinese 29 Jan 81 p 1

[Article by GUANGZHOU RIBAO commentator: "Unconditionally Maintain Political Unanimity With Party Central Committee"]

[Text] Recently the party Central Committee went a step further and analyzed the political and economic situation in our country. It correctly summed up the experience and lessons in economic work over the past 31 years, adopted a momentous policy of further economic readjustment and further political stability, decided on the tasks, policy and important measures concerning economic work, and planned the strengthening of political-ideological work. This is a continuation and development of the correct general and specific policies formulated since the Third Plenum of the 11th CCP Congress. It is a further implementation of the guiding thought, seeking truth in facts and rectifying the leftist errors, and of the policy of "readjustment, consolidation and improvement." It is of momentous and far-reaching significance.

The party relies on the party organizations and the entire body of party members at all levels to unite and lead the broad masses of the people to implement the correct line and general and specific policies of the party. For this reason, party organizations at all levels and the entire body of party members are required to maintain political unanimity unconditionally with the party Central Committee. Otherwise, the line and general and specific policies of the party will be disrupted and discounted, so that it will be impossible to carry them out smoothly. .

How can political unanimity be unconditionally maintained with the party Central Committee?

First of all, we should conscientiously study the important speeches by the responsible comrades of the Central Committee, correctly comprehend and grasp the spirit of the important policy decisions made by the Central Committee and, on this basis and in light of the actual conditions of the departments and units concerned, sum up the lessons and experiences and work out specific measures for implementation. Here, a correct and clear understanding of the present situation is a prerequisite that must be acquired. Is the present situation favorable or unfavorable to economic readjustment and political stability? The situation,

it should be said, is excellent but the difficulties are great. After the "gang of four" was smashed, and particularly since the third plenum, the party Central Committee has redefined the correct political line, ideological line and organizational line, strengthened the socialist democracy and legal system, restored and developed the national economy, and improved and raised people's living standard with marked results. In Guangzhou municipality, the finance and economy have been enlivened and the market is thriving. Purchase and sale of goods, revenues, and people's savings hit record highs, and the inhabitants' purchasing power increased by more than 800 million yuan last year compared with 1978. Happy and united as one, the entire party and the whole nation are proceeding with the four modernizations program. The present political situation in our country, it may be said, is the most stable since the sixties. The economic situation is excellent, too. This is obvious to everybody and is generally recognized. However great difficulties lie on the road ahead. We must not lose sight of a danger latent in the excellent situation: huge financial deficits, inflation and rising prices. This state of affairs should be historically analyzed. For more than 20 years we made "left" errors in directing the economic work, causing great economic imbalances. In the first 2 years after smashing the "gang of four," we underestimated the grave difficulties caused by the 10-year calamity and failed to make a clean sweep of the "left" errors. Because of this and also because of our lack of experience in modernization, we put forward some slogans and targets that were beyond the financial and material resources of the state. This intensified the economic imbalances and increased the financial and economic difficulties. With a view to a fundamental change in the passive state and dangerous situation and steady and smooth progress of the four modernizations program, the party Central Committee at the right moment worked out the policy decision on economic readjustment. It is very obvious that only a resolute readjustment can bring about a harmonious economic balance and eliminate the financial deficits, thereby insuring faster development of industrial and agricultural production. One step back is aimed at two steps forward. At the same time, readjustment does not mean simple retreat, but a combination of retreat with advance. Therefore, the policy of readjustment is a healthy one and has been soberly worked out. Some comrades lose sight of the mainstream of the situation and do not understand that to retreat is to advance. As a result, they are full of worries and are not confident of success in the four modernizations. Or else, they care only about partial interests and overlook the overall interests and assume a hesitant and wavering attitude toward the policy of readjustment. It is unnecessary and wrong to assume such an attitude. Implementation of the readjustment policy has a bearing on the fundamental interests of the whole nation and on the overall situation regarding the four modernizations. Under the centralized unified leadership of the party Central Committee and in light of the actual conditions of the departments and units concerned, we must work out specific plans and measures as quickly as possible, unite as one, and go all out to win victory.

Second, it is necessary to strengthen organizational discipline, obey the command of the party Central Committee in all actions, and carry out the policy of economic readjustment 100 percent. In fulfilling the formidable task of economic readjustment, we should have a sober understanding of the present difficulties while keeping the favorable conditions in view. Compare the present readjustment

with that in the early sixties. The national economy was declining sharply at that time and people in many localities found it difficult to get enough food. At present, industrial and agricultural production keeps increasing. At that time, there was a great shortage of major commodities on the market. Now, they are comparatively ample. At that time, bank savings dropped sharply. Now, bank deposits are going up year by year. In addition, our economic activities with foreign countries are being stepped up. All these are favorable conditions. However, it should be noted that the work is very difficult mainly because it involves many aspects and heavy tasks and affects people's livelihood. Furthermore, it is necessary to watch out for a small number of people with ulterior motives who take advantage of the readjustment to make trouble. It is precisely because of the heavy tasks and numerous difficulties that the party organizations at all levels and the entire body of party members must strengthen organizational discipline; individuals must be subordinate to the organization, the minority to the majority, the lower level to the higher level, and the entire party to the Central Committee. Party members who object to important theoretical issues and policy issues of a political nature worked out by the party Central Committee may discuss their views on appropriate occasions within the party and may put forward their views according to definite organizational procedures. They may not make antagonistic speeches among the masses and may not assume an attitude of objection or passive resistance. For this reason, we should insure centralization and unity with regard to the readjustment policy and the important measures determined by the party Central Committee. We may not carry them out half-heartedly, feign compliance or refuse to carry them out. It must be borne in mind that the present readjustment policy is a continuation and development of the correct general and specific policies formulated since the third plenum, a further implementation of the guiding line realistically formulated by the third plenum to rectify the left errors. Seeing the readjustment policy put forward, some people who already doubted, resented and even refused to carry out the correct guiding principle and policy formulated since the third plenum have now come to the conclusion that everything is going to "change" again and that the truth seems to be in their hands again. Their opinion is not only misguided but also utterly wrong. If there is any change at all, it is in getting rid of the faults in our work that do not conform to the decision of the third plenum, getting rid of impractical ideas and getting rid of high targets set subjectively. This change is precisely the goal of the line of the third plenum. As long as we take into account both the favorable conditions and the difficulties in our work, consciously strengthen organization discipline, subordinate the individual and partial interests to the collective and overall interests, resolutely carry out the policy decision adopted by the party Central Committee, and share the party's cares and burdens and the people's cares and burdens by every conceivable means, we shall certainly be able to triumph over difficulties and smoothly fulfill the formidable task of economic readjustment.

Third, it is necessary to uphold the four basic principles, carry forward the fine tradition and style of the party, and forcefully combat words and deeds that damage the interests of the party and the people. The four basic principles are the code of conduct for each Communist Party member and are specifically required to maintain the unanimity of the whole party in thinking and action. To fulfill the formidable task of economic readjustment, party organizations at

all levels and the entire body of party members are required to uphold the four basic principles and adhere to the socialist road. The party must meet the requirements of the new situation ideologically, organizationally and in the style of work. The present readjustment is a test to party organizations at all levels and to the entire body of party members. In the process of readjustment we should strengthen ideological-political work, restore and carry forward the fine tradition and work style of the party, build close relations between the party and the masses, share joys and sorrows with the masses, wage an arduous struggle, consciously overcome the unhealthy tendencies toward seeking privileges and practicing bureaucratism, resolutely oppose the evil trends of ultra-individualism and anarchism, and forcefully combat words and deeds that damage the interests of the party and the people. Now that we have put the open-door policy into effect, we can introduce advanced science and technology from abroad, and at the same time many bad features of capitalism will be brought in. In Guangdong, specific policies and flexible measures are being implemented, and along with the development of economic activities with foreign countries, many economic, social and cultural problems have cropped up. Some party members and leading party cadres are unable to withstand the sugar-coated bullets of the bourgeoisie. They exploit their functions and power, collude with outsiders, are corrupt and accept bribes, take part in smuggling and speculation and make big fortunes, openly violating party discipline and state laws. In Guangzhou, which is at the southern gate of our fatherland, imperialists, social imperialists, Taiwan Guomindang agents, the remnant forces of Lin Biao and the "gang of four," the heads of antiparty and antisocialist underground organizations and underground publications, criminals engaging in subversive activities, gangsters, ringleaders of agitation and troublemakers are wantonly carrying out disruptive activities. They must be firmly fought against, divided and broken up. Only by seriously correcting the party style, strengthening the democratic dictatorship of the people and maintaining political stability and unity can we achieve economic readjustment and smoothly proceed with the four modernizations.

The road of revolution has never been smooth. But there have never been difficulties we communists cannot overcome. Let us rouse ourselves, increase our conviction, rally closely around the party Central Committee, and make due contributions to economic readjustment and the four modernizations.

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## PARTY AND STATE

### ZHOU ENLAI CITED ON MEANING OF 'PROLETARIAN LEADER'

Guangzhou GUANGZHOU RIBAO in Chinese 22 Jan 81 p 3

[Article by Zhen Bingchang [3914 3521 2490]: "The Proletarian Leader Is a Human, Not a God--Reading Between the Lines of 'Learning From Mao Zedong'"]

[Text] In May 1949, Zhou Enlai [0719 1869 0171], in making his report to the first All-China Congress of Youth, put forth to the assembled young people the guiding slogan: "Learn from Mao Zedong." With a thoroughly materialistic attitude, he correctly elucidated the relationship between proletarian leader Mao Zedong [3029 3419 2639] and the Chinese revolutionary movement and Chinese people, pointing out: "Mao Zedong is the greatest personage to grow from the Chinese earth." But he admonished the young people: "You must not look on Mao Zedong as an accidental, innate, or magical leader who did not need to learn." A study of this lecture reveals a very important meaning for our correct treatment of proletarian leaders and for advancing the purification of the evil influence of Lin Biao's [2651 1753] and the "gang of four's" great stimulation of the cult of personality.

How we should treat the proletarian leader is a major question of principle for the modern international communist movement. There are two opposing attitudes toward this question: one reflects the point of view of historical materialism, correctly criticizing the utility of the individual heroic personage in history and correctly treating the relationship between the leader and the people; the other comes from the point of view of idealism and proclaims that the hero produces history, deifying the leader and wanting the masses to bow and scrape before him. Comrade Zhou Enlai upheld the concept of a leader from the standpoint of historical materialism and opposed the concept of the leader from the standpoint of historical idealism, making clear the simple truth that a proletarian leader is a man, not a god.

A proletarian leader comes from the people and is the outstanding representative produced by the long-term revolutionary movement, and is not a "messiah" sent down to man from heaven. As the greatest leader of the Chinese people, Comrade Mao Zedong certainly was not an accidental or unique phenomenon; rather he was intimately connected with the history of the Chinese revolution and the practice of the Chinese people's long struggle. Comrade Zhou Enlai, in analyzing this problem, pointed out: "Our leaders grew up among the people, are linked like

flesh and blood to the Chinese people, are closely linked to China's land and Chinese society, and are the people's leaders produced by the experience and lessons of the revolutionary movement's many years of history since the "4 May" movement and of the last hundred years in China." That is to say, Comrade Mao Zedong is a great personage produced by the special historical conditions of the Chinese revolution's development in the early and middle years of the 20th century, a leader forged in the long revolutionary struggle of the Chinese people, who has a connection like that of flesh and blood with the people. One obvious characteristic of Lin Biao's movement to create a god was his proclamation that Comrade Mao Zedong was an isolated god. He said: "Only one genius of this kind has been produced in the rest of the world in several hundred years and in China in several thousand years." Not only was Mao Zedong set apart from the mass of Chinese proletarian leaders, but his connection with the history of the Chinese revolution was also severed, as was his flesh and blood-like relationship with the Chinese people. He was deified as a savior "on whom Heaven had bestowed a great responsibility."

Proletarian leaders undergo tempering and processes of conversion and developmental maturation; they are not born geniuses. An analysis of materialist epistemology tells us that human knowledge and ability are not innate, but are attained only after birth. It is the same for the great person as it is for the common man; as a precondition for putting his abilities to use he must increase his abilities in the process. Apart from the practice of revolution, there can be no proletarian leader. Comrade Zhou Enlai understood that in studying Mao Zedong it is necessary "to study him in terms of his historical development." He mentioned several examples that made it clear that Comrade Mao Zedong was not a "sage" recognizable at birth, but rather was one who matured through a process of historical development. There can be no doubt that a person grows up in a certain historical period and is necessarily influenced by the social consciousness of that period; he especially will be influenced by the thought of a ruling class that has been in power a long time. Comrade Mao Zedong was no exception. He was educated in the feudal culture and was influenced by feudalistic thought. He himself said that he had previously passed through several types of non-Marxist thought--believing in Confucius, then Kant, and only later coming to Marxism, to which he was converted only during the long revolutionary struggle. It is just as Comrade Zhou Enlai pointed out about Comrade Mao Zedong: "What was great about him was that he was able to awaken from these false teachings and deny the old things. His greatness lay in his daring to recognize the faults of the old." In the same way there can be no doubt that Comrade Mao Zedong not only went through various types of non-Marxist thought during his historical development, but he also could manifest weaknesses and errors, even after he became a great proletarian leader, especially in his later years. Mao Zedong previously had always emphasized that we should take an attitude of conscientious effort toward the weaknesses and errors of the central leaders. But in the days when the cult of personality was in vogue, if someone dared in the name of conscientious effort to criticize Mao Zedong's faults or discuss his various weaknesses and errors, Lin Biao and the "gang of four" would "maliciously attack" them and criminally persecute them.

A proletarian leader can learn and is not a magical personage beyond learning. Historical materialism and historical idealism have opposing concepts of a leader;

the opposition appears in the questions of whether a great person can or cannot learn, whether or not he consents to exceeding himself in this regard. Since the proletarian leader springs from within the struggle of the infinite masses, he has a flesh and blood-like relationship with the masses; these leaders all use their own thought, language, and actions to influence others, attracting and uniting the broad masses toward the goal of advancing communism. Thus we study the communist thought and character of proletarian leaders, learning from their conscientious work that everything starts from reality, the scientific attitude that springs equally from theory and practice, studying their close connection with the masses, their daring criticism and self-criticism, and their workstyle of privation and struggle. This is both necessary and possible. To give leaders a mystical and religious coloration above the common mire is to make them images of worship and now allow them to serve as objects of study, and to do that is certainly inconsistent with the concept of the leader in historical materialism. Comrade Zhou Enlai, in judging this kind of tendency toward error, pointed out: "Since no one can learn from him, is not then Mao Zedong being isolated by everyone? Is this not then to make Mao Zedong an isolated god? The kind of leader propagated by feudal and capitalist societies?"

Communist affairs are the affairs of the infinite masses. The long process of communist struggle produces not just one generation of leaders but generation after generation of leaders, each carrying on the struggle. Because of this, we not only want to learn from the older group of proletarian leaders and to continue their efforts, but we want to improve on them and advance beyond their accomplishments. This is regeneration, the general law of the universe that can never be resisted.

We should study Comrade Zhou Enlai's thoroughly materialistic spirit, his conscientious treatment of the proletarian leader, and his accurate summation of the lessons of historical experience so that our later work will be even better.

## PARTY AND STATE

### IDEOLOGICAL WORK FOR ECONOMIC READJUSTMENT EMPHASIZED

Nanjing XINHUA RIBAO in Chinese 10 Jan 81 p 1

[Article: "Strengthen Ideological-Political Work; Guarantee the Smooth Realization of the Task of Readjustment"]

[Text] In the new year we should further strengthen and improve ideological-political work and mobilize the broad masses of cadres and people in the province to strive for the formidable task of all-round readjustment of the national economy.

The present readjustment program represents a fundamental change in the policy of economic construction, affecting the situation as a whole, producing an impact on various sides and necessarily giving rise to various ideological and practical problems. We must fully realize that economic readjustment is a very formidable and complicated task and we must consciously strengthen and improve ideological-political work to meet the requirements of the present economic situation. In the process of readjusting the economy, we should carry out good ideological-political work purposefully and meticulously so as to insure consistency in ideology and action inside and outside the party.

We should, in light of the actual state of affairs, explain clearly why a question of readjustment or sufficient retrenchment arises in the process of achieving the four modernizations, why it is imperative to readjust the economy further, what problems may crop up in the course of readjustment and what will be the results of successful readjustment. Over the years our comrades have insisted that if we want to change the economic backwardness of our country and raise the material and cultural standards of the masses, we must race against time and go all out to develop the national economy by leaps and bounds. Thus they are afraid that stressing the need to retrench sufficiently where necessary will slow down the tempo of economic construction, hold up progress of the four modernizations and interfere with improving the people's livelihood. There are also comrades who regard the present readjustment program as a passive policy. All this is an expression of inadequate understanding of the importance and urgency of further readjustment. We should bring it home to everyone that with the series of lines and general and specific policies implemented since the third plenum of the party, nationwide the economic situation is really favorable. But because of inefficient implementation of the readjustment policy over the past

2 years, huge financial deficits, inflation and rising prices, there is a latent financial and economic crisis. If resolute measures are not taken against this, not only will the economic benefits obtained by the peasants and workers since the third plenum be lost but our economic work will fail to break out of the passive state and it will be impossible to proceed smoothly with the modernization program. Only when we grasp fully the readjustment policy, retrench sufficiently where necessary, and resolutely cut down what should be cut down can we remove the latent danger, insure the stability of the economic situation as a whole and gradually regain the initiative in our economic work. By retrenching sufficiently we mean mainly cutting down on capital construction investments; closing down, suspending, merging or changing some enterprises which lack adequate conditions for production; cutting down on administrative expenses and keeping within the limit of our resources when undertaking production and construction, providing administrative facilities and improving people's livelihood. Other spheres--agriculture, light industry, production of goods for people's daily use, construction of energy and communications projects as well as educational, scientific, cultural and health undertakings--should be continuously developed as far as possible.

In short, it is not that production is not to be developed, but that blind development and redundant construction are to be prevented and steady development is to be insured. The living standard of the majority of the people is not to be lowered but to be gradually raised. Such a readjustment is obviously not a passive policy but an active one. In a deeper sense, conscious implementation of economic readjustment is aimed at making our economic work cast off the shackles of "left" thinking and approach prevailing over the past 20 years and more, at taking China's actual circumstances as the point of departure, at keeping all undertakings within the limit of resources, at advancing step by step on solid ground, at emphasizing practical results, and at combining economic development closely with improvement of the people's livelihood, thereby avoiding economic imbalance and insuring healthy progress of the four modernizations on a stable basis.

Furthermore, we should permeate the process of economic readjustment with ideological-political work and help our cadres at all levels, particularly cadres of the economic departments, to face the state of affairs in our country, get rid of the "leftist" influence, correct their guiding thought in economic work, adopt an overall point of view and raise their level of political consciousness regarding further readjustment. It should be brought home to all comrades that the reason why we kept making "left" mistakes in economic construction in the past was because we did not make a serious study of the state of affairs in our country, and thus concerning the guiding policy we were always overanxious for quick results and made advances impetuously, with the result that our national economy suffered one setback after another. During the 2 years of readjustment, some of our comrades, long influenced by "leftist" thinking, gave more thought to the question of speed and less to harmonious proportions and thought in terms of "Jiangsu is special." As a result, they understood readjustment insufficiently, refused to retrench where necessary, strove to go ahead where they should not, and undertook production and construction indiscriminately, thereby causing enormous waste and creating new difficulties in the work of

readjustment. We must learn our lessons and unify our guiding thoughts on this point regarding economic construction. In a large country like ours with a large population, poor foundation and low level, construction can only be undertaken within the limits of our resources, and advances must be made step by step on solid ground. We must not be overzealous for quick results. We must not blindly seek an impractical rate of development regardless of actual conditions and possibilities, nor may we onesidedly pursue a rate of economic development at the cost of cutting down on people's consumer needs. Only by unifying our thinking on this point can we raise our level of political consciousness, overcome blindness, speak with a common language and take unified action in the present economic readjustment and the forthcoming economic construction. Furthermore, it should be brought home to all comrades that readjusting the economy, stabilizing the economy and stabilizing people's livelihood--these concern the overall situation and are where the fundamental interests of the party and the people lie. For this reason, we should care about the overall interests, keep the cardinal principles in mind, take the whole country into account, and oppose the incorrect attitude of caring about the interests of localities, departments and enterprises rather than the overall interests and ignoring the policy decisions made by the party Central Committee. Cadres at all levels should be taught to grasp the opportunity of readjustment to reorganize their construction projects and enterprises effectively, improve their operation and administration, raise their level of production technology, improve the economic results in every respect and create more wealth for the state.

Fulfillment of the formidable and complicated task of all-round readjustment of the national economy presupposes stability and unity. If the political situation of stability and unity is undermined, it will be impossible to proceed with the work of readjustment. To consolidate and develop the political situation marked by stability and unity is the common aspiration of the broad masses of cadres and people. Party organizations at all levels should carry out good ideological-political work and teach the broad masses of cadres and people to watch out for those with ulterior motives who seize the opportunity of readjustment to make trouble. We should wage effective struggle against all forces that undermine stability and unity; resolutely combat and break up the remnant forces of the Lin Biao and Jiang Qing counterrevolutionary cliques, and resolutely combat, guard against and crush criminal activities. We should actively, forcefully and convincingly publicize the four basic principles and conduct propaganda to convince the masses that without the leadership of the Communist Party, a large country like China would certainly fall apart and accomplish nothing. Whether or not we uphold the party leadership will determine the achievement of the four modernizations and the success of their present readjustment program. Any tendency toward weakening, shaking off, doing away with or opposing the party leadership cannot be allowed to go unchecked under any circumstances. We should conduct criticism and education and wage the necessary struggle from a clear stand. In the process of economic readjustment, we must also intensify education concerning discipline and the legal system. Socialist democracy and the socialist legal system are indivisible; democracy without the socialist legal system, without the party leadership and without discipline is anything but socialist democracy. On the contrary, such democracy can only plunge the whole society into anarchy and make it more difficult to democratize the country.

develop the national economy and improve the people's livelihood. For this reason, both cadres and workers and students should study and submit themselves to discipline, and all phenomena of indiscipline, anarchy and violation of the legal system must be opposed and resolutely rectified.

Other very important features of ideological-political work in the course of economic readjustment concern how to increase people's scientific belief in communism and arouse people's revolutionary spirit in the face of temporary difficulties; how to guide the people to develop a lofty style of loving the country and the collective, putting public interests before private interests, taking pleasure in helping others, uniting and cooperating with others; and how to build a spiritual civilization, resist the corrosive influence of bourgeois, feudalist and other nonproletarian ideas. Some people think that matter is primary and spirit is secondary, that if the material living standard is raised people's spiritual outlook and social morality and practice will spontaneously improve, and that the material living standard is still low at present and it is no use to preach the spirit of Lei Feng again. There are also those who ask: Do we not stress the principle of material interest now? Do we not encourage "expertness in making money" and permit a section of the people to "get rich first"? Is it not an appropriate occasion to preach the communist spirit and ideal and the lofty style of serving the interests of others and not one's own interests? It is wrong and harmful to set the principle of material interests against people's communist moral standard and to set the policy of permitting a section of the people to get rich first against the policy of adhering to the socialist road, thereby negating the necessity of building a spiritual civilization. Implementing a socialist policy is not contradictory to developing the communist spirit. On the contrary, in order to build socialism it is necessary to develop the communist spirit. If during the period of New Democratic Revolution we persisted in using the communist ideological system to guide all kinds of work, using the communist morality to keep the words and deeds of communists and advanced elements within bounds, and encouraged and cited the revolutionary spirit--serving the people wholeheartedly, subordinating individuals to the organization, being selfless, serving the interests of others and not one's own interests, and defying hardship and death--why do we need to propagate communist ideology when socialist modernization is going on today? May we ask whether negating the communist ideal and spirit does not signify disarming ourselves spiritually? Without the communist ideal and spirit, can we guide the masses of the people in waging an arduous struggle, overcoming the present difficulties and building a modernized, powerful socialist country? The socialist state we are building will have not only a high-level material civilization but also a high-level spiritual civilization. The spiritual civilization we have in mind refers not only to education, science and culture but also to communist thinking, ideals, faith, morality, discipline, revolutionary stand and principles and comradely relations between man and man. Without this spiritual civilization, without the communist ideal, without the communist morality, how can people build socialism? In order to build this spiritual civilization, on the one hand we should continue to criticize and oppose the tendency toward worshipping capitalism and advocating bourgeois liberalization; criticize and oppose the decadent bourgeois ideology--benefitting oneself at the expense of others, putting profit-making first, "doing everything for money"--and criticize and oppose anarchism and ultra-individualism. On the other, we should carry forward

the spirit displayed during the protracted revolutionary period, that is, the death-defying spirit, the spirit of abiding by discipline and making self-sacrifices, the spirit of being selfless and putting the interests of others before one's own interests, and the spirit of overpowering all enemies and overcoming all difficulties. All communists, particularly the leading party cadres, should not only keep up and develop this spirit but also spread it to the masses of the people and youth so that they will become the mainstay of spiritual civilization in the People's Republic of China. Our Communist Party cadres and the masses of the people are capable of displaying this revolutionary spirit and lofty style. They are an inestimable great force. Party organizations and cadres at all levels and all mass organizations should take it as an important task of ideological-political work to build a high-level spiritual civilization and take effective measures to grasp it in the true sense of the word.

The present task of ideological-political work designed to insure the smooth progress of readjustment work is a very heavy one. Party organizations at all levels should place it in an important position and grasp it. They should set aside part of their main energy to do this ideological-political work, to work with individuals and to do mass work. To insure successful leadership regarding the readjustment, we must see to it that our party meets the requirements of the new situation ideologically, organizationally and in style of work. In the process of readjustment, we should emphasize correct party style, improve leadership and strengthen the party's fighting capability. We should go a step further and carry forward the fine tradition of the party, build close relations between the party and the masses, share weal and woe with the masses, and overcome the unhealthy trends of becoming privileged and practicing bureaucracy. Only by strengthening the relations between the party and the masses can the numerous difficulties in economic readjustment be overcome easily. We should seriously implement the principle of democratic centralism, strengthen party organization and discipline, step up party activity, and oppose the evil trends of ultra-individualism and anarchism. In particular, we should resolutely oppose the wrong attitude and double-dealing practice of feigning compliance with the line and general and specific policies of the party Central Committee. We should teach all the aged, middle-aged and young cadres to strengthen unity, pull themselves up, wage an arduous struggle and work hard. As long as we strengthen ideological-political work and as long as the whole party, the whole army and the whole people carry forward the spirit of solidarity and militancy, the task of all-round readjustment of the national economy will certainly be achieved! The magnificent goal of building a modernized, powerful socialist country will certainly be attained!

9780  
CSO: 4003

## PARTY AND STATE

### ARTICLE URGES SUPPORT FOR UNIFIED PARTY LEADERSHIP

Jinan DAZHONG RIBAO in Chinese 11 Feb 81 p 1

[Article by Commentator: "Party Leadership is the Core of the Four Basic Principles]

[Text] To exercise party leadership is to adhere to the core of the four basic principles. In order to adhere to the four basic principles for the purpose of doing a good job in the construction of the four modernizations on the basis of stability and unity, the most important issue is to guarantee the centralized and unified leadership of the party.

The four basic principles are, in fact, to a great extent, a condensation of the program, lines, and guiding ideology of the party. To adhere to the four basic principles is to exercise party leadership in the cause of socialism. The conclusion that "the Chinese Communist Party is the core of leadership of the people of the whole country," which is clearly stated in the constitution of our country, is not only a penetrating summation of the experience of the Chinese revolution, but also the most important guarantee of victory in the socialist construction of modernization. As the true representative of the interests of the working class and the people of the whole country, the Chinese Communist Party, in the course of revolution lasting as much as 60 years, went through extremely complicated and strenuous struggles and made enormous sacrifices to lead the masses of the people to overthrow the three big mountains and found a socialist China with the beginnings of prosperity. The people have, from their own personal experiences and from comparing the Chinese Communist Party with other political parties and political powers, reached the conclusion: Without the Communist Party there would not be a new China, nor would there be socialism or the working class and the laboring people of today. Similarly, in the glorious march toward the four modernizations, only the Chinese Communist Party can unite, mobilize and lead 1 billion Chinese people to accomplish this historic mission. At present, while we are making further readjustments in our economy and taking further steps to maintain political stability in order to solve the various complicated problems which face us, we must earnestly strengthen the centralized and unified party leadership and conscientiously implement a whole set of principles and policies of the party.

In order to strengthen party leadership, it is first of all necessary to improve party leadership. In order to strengthen and improve party leadership, it is most

important and pressing to improve party workstyle. The question of party workstyle is a question of life and death to the party. The accomplishment of a party program and party stand or the implementation of party lines, principles and policies would be interrupted if the party workstyle were not upright and not to the satisfaction of the people. We must conscientiously carry out the "Guiding Principles for Internal Party Political Life" and conscientiously correct various unhealthy tendencies. At present, the most important thing is that party organizations at all levels and party members as a whole unconditionally carry out the lines, principles and policies formulated by the party Central Committee. Adopting an attitude of saying one thing and meaning another or agreeing overtly but opposing covertly is absolutely not allowable. It is necessary to conscientiously observe party discipline and carry out the organizational principle of the party in order to emphatically realize the goal that an individual is to submit himself to an organization, the minority is subordinate to the majority, the lower level to the higher level, and the whole party to the party Central Committee. Only by doing so can our party maintain a high degree of consistency politically and organizationally and bring into full play the role of the party as a fighting force in implementing principles of readjustment, in safeguarding stability and unity, and in developing an excellent situation.

Party committees at all levels must maintain close links with the realities and with the masses, take effective measures to strengthen political ideology, and conscientiously solve various ideological problems within the party and among the masses of the people. These are the important essentials and ways to strengthen and improve party leadership. The party must concentrate its efforts in dealing with the people and with ideological problems. It is not possible for the party to take on everything no matter whether it is important or not. That would mean that the party would fail to grasp the essentials. There is also room for improvement in many aspects of the style and the way in which the party exercises its leadership. While measures are being taken to strengthen party leadership, we must at the same time give full play to the role of government and professional departments at all levels in order to prevent the party from taking the place of the government and to prevent enterprises from allowing the party committees to make decisions on everything. It is also necessary to conscientiously improve party leadership in various sectors such as education, scientific research, literature and art, and so forth by combining their respective distinguishing features with the new situation under a new historical condition. To make every effort to improve party leadership is an issue which should attract the serious attention of the whole party. If this issue cannot be resolved properly, it will be impossible to talk about reinforcing the centralized and unified leadership of the party.

The broad masses of party members, party and political cadres at all levels, and the masses of the people as a whole must strengthen their sense of responsibility to the party, conscientiously submit themselves to party leadership, and uphold party prestige. On this question, we must first seriously and conscientiously criticize various erroneous views which are detrimental to party leadership. These are people who are skeptical about or even negate party leadership when they take note of some shortcomings and mistakes of our party or of the gaps existing between the economic situation of our country and that of the advanced nations by saying that our party has done nothing right. It is extremely wrong to "far out from

point to area" and to think that the phenomenon of any particular area reflects the overall situation. Our party in the course of leading our country to carry out socialist revolution and socialist construction has indeed passed along a lot of winding roads and found various shortcomings and mistakes. However, in comparing the merits of the party with its mistakes, the merits are fundamental and primary. At the same time, all of the shortcomings and mistakes of the party are corrected by ourselves. Were not ulcers such as Lin Biao and the "gang of four," which once endangered the life of the party, also excised by our own party? Compared with the economically advanced nations of the world, it is true that we still have a long way to go to improve our national economy. However, people who know our history understand that this gap was not caused in the past 30 years, but is a result of the feudal system over a long period of time, the corruption and incompetence of the Kuomintang Party, and the imperialist aggression and plunder. At the time of the founding of new China, what we inherited was an awful mess of "poverty and blankness." In the more than 30 years since the establishment of the people's republic, even though we have traveled along some tortuous paths and met with a number of obstructions, still we succeeded in narrowing this gap. During that period, the original outlook of poverty and backwardness in China changed a lot. At present, the living standard of the people both in villages and cities has obviously improved in comparison with the past. Looking back at the successes achieved in the past 31 years, can any of the political parties or political organizations in the history of our country be compared with the Chinese Communist Party? Therefore, the criticism that our party is without a single redeeming feature, followed by a negation of our party, must be either ignorant or harbor an ulterior motive. This is what we must refute and fight against.

In order to strengthen and improve party leadership, we must also criticize and overcome tendencies toward anarchism and ultrademocracy which exist among some people. To develop socialist democracy and strengthen the socialist legal system are the basic principles adopted by the party Central Committee since the Third Plenum of the 11th CCP Central Committee. These principles are firm and indomitable. However, it is absolutely necessary to correct erroneous tendencies which reverse right and wrong. These tendencies are similar to those that existed during the 10-year period of turmoil. At that time, people who observed discipline were satirized, muggers were praised as heroes, and the more severe the disturbance the more the situation was described as excellent. It is understood that pernicious influences in this respect still exist among certain people up to the present. There are individuals who take pride in keeping the party committee at a distance and in singing a different tune. They even go further, putting forth measures practiced during the "Great Cultural Revolution" to create disturbances. This is absolutely not permissible. It is necessary to explain clearly to the masses both inside and outside the party that socialist democratic centralism means to combine centralism on the basis of democracy with democracy under centralized guidance. We do not endorse democracy without leadership and we are even more opposed to the so-called "great democracy" practiced during the "Great Cultural Revolution." It is also necessary to strictly draw a clear line of demarcation between socialist democracy and bourgeois liberalism as well as anarchism. Socialist democracy must be developed and the legitimate democratic rights of the masses must be protected. However, party committees at all levels must dare to criticize and check the words and deeds of bourgeois liberalism and

so forth put forward by opposition parties which are not allowed to run rampant without restraint. People who were in favor of anarchism during the "Great Cultural Revolution" once shouted the fashionable slogan, "party committees at a certain level do not represent the party." Of course, it is not appropriate to equate a party committee at a certain level or a member of a party committee with the party. However, party committees at a certain level are, after all, part of the party organization. If party committees at all levels are all negated and authorities of party committees at all levels are totally lost, where does the party exist? And how could we then talk about a centralized and unified party leadership? This does not mean that we cannot criticize shortcomings or mistakes made by party organizations at certain levels or by certain cadres, but criticism of this kind must be made out of goodwill and in accordance with organizational procedures. Otherwise, not only the problem itself cannot be resolved, but on the contrary things will be turned into a mess.

Such a great country as China is bound to fall apart and accomplish nothing if it does not have the Communist Party. Since we have a population of 1 billion people and have just put to an end turmoil lasting as long as 10 years, a great many political, economic, and other problems are waiting for us to resolve. Historical experience shows that centralized and unified party leadership is required to overcome difficulties. If the party from top to bottom unites together to dedicate hearts and souls to the same cause, and the people of the whole country rally around the party to submit themselves to party leadership and to obey party orders, we will unquestionably be powerful enough to overcome all difficulties on the road ahead of us and to implement further readjustments economically and further stability politically in order to create even better conditions for smoothly carrying out the construction of socialist modernization.

9560

CSO: 4005

## PARTY AND STATE

### IDEOLOGICAL, POLITICAL WORK MUST SHUN COERCIVE TACTICS

#### 'Channeling' and 'Dredging'

Nanjing XINHUA RIBAO in Chinese, 10 Jan 81 p 3

[Article by Yi Xiang [0110 3276] and Yi Gen [0076 2704]: "Notes on Party Work-- Ideological Work Depends on Dredging"]

[Text] There have always been two ways of doing ideological and political work: one is by suppression, plugging; the other is by dredging, channeling. Practice proves that the former is erroneous and the latter is correct.

Both positive and negative experiences tell us that in order to solve the people's problem of ideological perception, we must adhere to the dredging, channeling principle. Dredging means letting people speak up, providing extensive avenues for expression, and gathering ideas to maximize benefits. Channeling means adopting many different methods to guide various nonproletarian ideologies in the correct direction. This principle of channeling while dredging, dredging while channeling, and both dredging and channeling is an important principle for strengthening our ideological and political work at present. Because we are a socialist state where the people are masters of their own house, all citizens have the right, and may go through many different channels, to convey their views and demands in their study, their work, and their life. Party organizations at various levels and the vast ranks of party members and cadres--all have the duty and responsibility to listen to their criticisms and suggestions so as to improve our various work projects. In adhering to the principle of dredging and channeling in our ideological and political work, our aim is to have everybody adhere to the four basic principles, adhere to the principles, policies and measures formulated by the party since the Third Plenary Session of the 11th Party Central Committee, so as to mobilize the enthusiasm of the vast ranks of the masses of people to build the four modernizations with one heart and one mind.

In adhering to the correct principle of dredging and channeling, we must first of all study the principle of propaganda. During the 10-year period of turmoil in the past, party ranks were subject to the influence of the "leftist" line. Some comrades today are still used to that kind of "philosophy of struggle" and are unclear about the fact that leaders are but the people's public servants.

Their role is but to serve the people; they have no right whatsoever to suppress the people's democratic rights. If leaders do not thoroughly abandon their past mistaken practice of suppression, plugging, they are bound to hurt the activism of the masses. Next, they must also adhere to comradely ideological guidance on the basis of equality. It is not strange that nonproletarian ideas should have emerged with the Party. But if party organizations and party members and cadres should give up or be remiss in providing guidance, this would be an indication that they have lost their principles or that their principles are not very strong in character. Naturally, guidance must be predicated on the basis of equality between comrades and be provided by means of discussion, in an enlightening approach, and through organizing discussions, assistance, visits, individual consultation, and similar devices, so that a common stand can be adopted on major points and differences kept intact on minor points, and the people's thinking can be genuinely unified under the party's line, principles and policies.

In providing ideological guidance, we must move people by our sentiments and persuade people by reasoning; we must also recognize that there must be a process to be undergone. We must by all means avoid treating the comrades around us with a bureaucratic attitude, or dealing with people's ideological perception problems by simplistic and crude means. We must insist on the principle of seeking truth from facts and objectively analyze the problems reflected in people's attempts to straighten out channels of communication, and especially firmly carry out the "three-don'ts policy" so as to protect the enthusiasm on the part of the masses to do their own thinking and to speak up without fear. When we proceed with concrete work, we should make it a point to differentiate practical problems from problems of ideological perception, problems of ideological perception from problems of standpoint and attitude, and errors committed at certain times and on individual matters from consistent mistakes. Meanwhile, when we straighten out channels of communication and provide guidance, leaders must adopt a lofty posture in actively owning up to their responsibilities, examining mistakes, straightening out relations, mitigating contradictions, and solving problems.

### Three Commandments

Nanjing XINHUA RIBAO in Chinese 13 Jan 81 p 3

[Article by Qin Zhifa [4440 1807 3127]: "Three Things To Guard Against In Ideological and Political Work"]

[Text] At present, the entire party is trying to strengthen our ideological and political work. Historical experience indicates that doing a good job of this can promote the development of material production and the enhancement of the people's spiritual civilization; it is an important guarantee that we will win victory in our undertakings. But in order really to give scope to the important guarantee function of ideological and political work, we must also guard against three things.

**Washing One's Hands of the Whole Thing Is the First Thing to Guard Against**

As a result of the disruption perpetrated by Lin Biao and Jiang Qing, we suffered a 10-year catastrophe when they unscrupulously resorted to "letting politics

have an impact on everything." The evil consequences of "letting politics have an impact on everything" are still fresh in our memory, and the consequences of washing one's hands of the whole thing have been witnessed by everybody. The former was no good; the latter would not do, either. People's ideas are diverse and complicated; in a period of historical change, their ideas are especially lively, and such ideas need even more to be unified. If everyone washes his hands of the whole thing, then not only can we not give scope to correct ideas or clarify fuzzy perceptions, but mistaken ideas cannot be rectified. This can easily allow complex ideas to aggravate the confusion, let originally minor matters drift into becoming big matters, radicalize internal contradictions, or even convert them into antagonistic contradictions and create astonishing incidents. Even in the case of leading personalities, all kinds of problems that require solution can be encountered in daily life. If we ignore them as well and refrain from providing timely guidance, they are likewise liable to proceed in the reverse direction and possibly turn into inconceivable tragedies. Also, because of the sabotage on the part of hostile elements, rumors are always being spread in society. If we witness such cases but fail to recognize them and hear the rumors but let them spread, then they will grow wild and deceive the entrapped believers. This is bound to disturb people's minds, affect the social order, and ruin our production and construction. All this shows that it would be completely mistaken for us to wash our hands of ideological and political work; it would mean abandoning the party's duties and responsibilities.

#### Empty Preaching May Be Said To Be the Second Thing to Guard Against

Existence determines our consciousness. The rise of problems in people's thinking is always connected with various practical problems, problems at the higher level such as affairs of state, the party's line, principles and policies, the state system, economic construction, diplomatic activities, etc., and at the lower level such daily chores as day-to-day requirements around the household and the basic necessities of life, love and marriage, birth, aging, illness and death, etc. If we drift away from such practical problems and talk only about abstract reasoning, how valuable can such "ideological work" be? How can the masses believe in you? We can be sure that such work is bound to fail. Of course, this is not to say that we do not need to talk about reasoning; in reality, doing ideological work is precisely when we should talk about reasoning; absence of discussion about reasoning would not make ideological work. The question is what reasoning to talk about. The aim of ideological and political work is to enable the people to understand their common interests and thereby to actively struggle for them. If we really think of reasoning, we must proceed from caring about and maintaining the immediate interests of the masses, pay attention to facts and speak the truth, combine the solution of ideological problems with the solution of practical problems, and let the masses see a better future from the point of view of their realistic interests so that they can further unite to make efforts for the realization of their common interests.

In guarding against "emptiness," we must also pay attention to teaching by personal example; this especially should be true in the case of leading cadres and party member cadres. If one only sings with a fine tone but demonstrates no action, and what is said to be tiptop is somehow not verified in actuality, then however entertaining one's words might sound, they are but empty, useless words.

### The Third Thing to Guard Against? Simplistic Suppression

There is no question that, insofar as ideological problems are concerned--and especially in the case of mistaken ideas and fuzzy perceptions--we cannot let them drift along; we should carry out criticism and education and preclude mistaken ideas. But under no circumstances should we become simplistic and crude or exert forcible suppression. If we dredge, a clogged channel will again be open; if we channel through, blocked water will again flow. Ideological work can only adopt dredging and channeling methods, that is, the methods of letting people speak up; having various ideological perceptions, views, and demands relevantly reflected; recognizing good persons and following them; and singling out bad persons and providing them with guidance. Even in the case of mistaken ideas, only a comradely attitude based on equitable discussion should be adopted, so that we can use the approach of criticism and self-criticism, move with true feelings those who hold such ideas, enlighten them with righteousness, and guide them toward the correct course. In case some cannot think matters through for the time being, "high pressure" should not be applied to set a time limit for them to make it imperative that they think them through; we should allow them to contemplate a little, or even reserve their opinions for a while, and then patiently enlighten them. An impatient person cannot have hot gruel; otherwise his mouth is going to be burned. In the case of ideas of the "returning tide" type, we must also allow those who hold them the opportunity to think about it, and then do our work on them. No difficulty is insurmountable if one sets one's mind on it. With respect to ideological contradictions that tend to become radicalized, we should even more earnestly try to give them the "cold treatment" and blunt them. Naturally, insisting on the principle of dredging does not exclude the possibility that in the case of certain problems, administrative intervention may be carried out under necessary conditions.

To sum up, only by guarding first against washing our hands of things, secondly against emptiness, and thirdly against suppression can our ideological and political work achieve outstanding results and really create a political situation of liveliness and vitality.

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CSO: 4005

## PARTY AND STATE

### 'YOUNG INDUSTRIALISTS' ADVISED TO KEEP 'REALISTIC SPIRIT'

Beijing BEIJING RIBAO in Chinese 31 Jan 81 p 3

[Article by Wei Jing [2607 5464]: "You Must Have Deep Roots to Become a Pillar of the State"]

[Text] Recently, we have sighted a number of new stars coming out on the economic front, among them are Di Xinhua [5049 2450 5478], a young and outstanding manager of the Jianfeng [1696 6265] Farm in Nei Monggol, and Deng Xiaochang [6772 1420 2790], a young director of the Siangji [1424 4472] Multiple-Product Factory in Zunyi County of Guizhou Province who has been yearning for industrial civilization. It is heartening and encouraging to witness their appearance. The practices of these young industrialists indicate that, as the hope of our motherland, the future younger generation is developing a new life for the implementation of the four modernizations in a down-to-earth manner. They are doing it with soaring aspirations and a wide field of vision, by hacking their way through difficulties and by rousing themselves to vigorous efforts to make our country strong.

In the 1980's, there is plenty of scope for one's talents, a vast world for the younger generation to develop their ability to the full. The young people are full of ideals and are equipped with a strong spirit of enterprise. They are concerned about the destiny and future of our country and dare to state their own views, and these are their most valuable characteristics. These characteristics are precisely the ones which spur them on to work hard for the country and to resolve to be capable persons in order to display their talents in the prime of life for the purpose of bringing China out of poverty and backwardness. These characteristics have blossomed into a radiant splendor which can be seen in both Di Xinhua and Deng Xiaochang. However, things may always have a dual nature. At a time when the young people are in possession of these precious characteristics, they often have some weaknesses accompanying them. This is why they cannot do a good job in basing their own ideals on the ground of reality and why they are bold and resolute enough but are short of realistic spirit. They even go further, regarding an arbitrary decision as decisive, trying to reach for what is beyond their grasp, and indulging in fantasy. I once had a young friend who considered himself a philosopher because he had studied a few books on philosophy. He dared to make hasty statements giving his own position in response to any question put before him, or even on some important theoretical issues. He was indeed quick in making statements of his own position. However, the result of his hasty reaction

was just as some other young friends laughingly said teasing him: "His answers are always quick, but all his answers are always wrong." His attitude revealed a weak point of young people, such as that of talking a lot but not saying anything substantial. Weak points such as this are manifestations of ideological infantilism. It is not particularly serious that there are weak points in youth. The key point lies in the fact that some youth fail to notice these weak points or even regard them as merits which they refuse to correct. This is what we are more concerned about.

It is easy for some young people to indulge in bad habits, such as ignoring reality or trying to attain what is beyond their reach. Most of these bad habits are caused by the fact that they lack a sober understanding of the relationship between the subjective and the objective. They are inclined to act in accordance with subjective desires in a burst of enthusiasm. But the objective world is a complicated one. In an objective world, whatever one does is restricted by various conditions and factors. Wishful thinking is bound to meet with a rebuff. As far as aspirations are concerned, if you want to accomplish something, the aspiration is merely a possibility. In order to turn aspiration into reality, factors such as how long your ability and energy lasts and whether various social conditions will permit it directly or indirectly influence your success. The objective world develops and changes according to a regular pattern. If your personal aspiration does not correspond to the pattern of development of the objective world, no matter "how high" or "how far" you wish to go, in the end you will never "fly as high" or "go as far" as you wish. This is because objective law is independent of individual will. Only by acting in accordance with objective law can we succeed. Young people must be full of ideals and be bold to speak and act. However, the ideals and the ways to speak and act we are talking about here must be based on a ground of respect for reality and laws, and subjective reality must conform to objective reality.

The mass of the young people admire and revere the fighting style and outstanding courage of our revolutionary teacher, Marx, in criticizing the capitalist world as these smashed all enemy resistance and advanced victoriously everywhere. The scientific truth Marx brought to light indeed sounded the death knell to the system of capitalism and pointed out a path for the working class to strive for liberation. Perhaps some may ask: How could a theory adopted by Marx be so extensively rooted in the hearts of millions of people of the working class? Lenin gave the answer to this question. He said: "It lies in the fact that this theory combines rigorous and advanced scientific methodology (which is the latest achievement of social science) with revolutionary spirit and that this combination is not achieved by chance (that is to say, it is not only because the founder of that theory had the qualities of both a scholar and a revolutionary) but is due to the two qualities in the theory itself being internally linked and inseparable." The fighting style and outstanding courage of Marx are inseparable from the fact that he perfectly combined the revolutionary spirit with scientific methodology. This fact was also reflected when he was engaged in writing "Das Kapital." "Das Kapital," which has been praised as the "bible of the working class," is a book which Marx took a total of 40 years to complete. This book is the fruit of many years of painstaking labor. When he was engaged in writing "Das Kapital," he was busy taking notes on the passages from more than 1,500 different books. He had

more than 100 notebooks, including original manuscripts, extracts, outlines, and reading notes. He carefully studied all types of courses concerning economics, such as agronomy, agricultural chemistry, practical technology, practical economics, and even double-entry bookkeeping, and so forth. For the purpose of writing some 20 or so pages on factory laws, at the British Museum he looked through investigative reports prepared by inspectors of factories in various places. He quoted testimonies from 304 investigative reports. Marx dared to criticize the old world, and his criticism was rigorous, conscientious and "on solid ground." The "footprints" left by him in both the reading room and the working room of the British Museum proved that spirit. What this tells us is that, in putting forward any ideas, no matter whether affirmative or negative, they cannot be divorced from a conscientious spirit and a practical, scientific attitude. A negative must have a reason to support it and an affirmative must hold its own ground. Any idea, no matter how bold it is, cannot hold its ground without the support of a sufficient and strong basis.

In fact, the advancement of any new idea and the success of any undertaking cannot become effective without putting a lot of conscientious and arduous labor in them. Some have felt that Newton was lucky to formulate the Law of Gravity all of a sudden simply because an apple fell on his head. Is there anything in the world as easy as that? No. "An apple falling to earth" might have inspired Newton, but before that he had long been engaged in studying the question of gravity. He studied assiduously and was so occupied in carrying out experiments as to forget food and sleep. At that time, he had already given the matter careful consideration, without having a clear and definite idea take shape. Afterward, again he was very patient in carrying out calculations, overcoming difficult points, getting to the root of the matter, and thereby verifying this law. Without carrying out assiduous study and research over a long period, it is unlikely that such a law could have been ascertained, even though his head was hit by a falling apple. It is always unhealthy to harbor any idea of leaving success to chance, nor is it advisable either to look forward to amazing the world with a single brilliant feat or to hanker after unexpected expedencies. The people who are most hopeful and most likely to accomplish a lot are those who have their feet planted on solid ground, who are eager to ponder, and who devote themselves to study and research. Here we may take Lewis H. Morgan as an example. "Ancient Society" is a book written by Morgan which Marx liked very much. He studied it assiduously. He took passages from it with which he planned to write a book on primitive society. Engels also highly appraised this book. He said that it "again discovers historical materialism, which was discovered by Marx 40 years ago." How did Morgan complete this monumental work? He visited regions inhabited by the Indians many times to observe their lifestyle, to inquire about their customs and habits, and to study the structure of their organizations. A profound affection was established between himself and the Indians. He was adopted by them as a member of a tribe. For a long time he lived among them and collected a vast amount of practical materials. Later on, he conducted investigations and studies all over the world on tribes who lived in similar primitive societies. By putting in 40 years of arduous labor, he was able to complete his "Ancient Society." In order to have great achievements or to achieve success in certain undertakings, it is necessary to decide on a practical goal, to be willing to pay the price and put time and energy into it. Our forefathers said: "The sweet smell of plum blossoms greets us only after a

severe cold." This is a wise remark made by an experienced person. If one who does not intend to seek truth from facts but tries to please the public with claptrap, in the end he will be unable to stand the test of history even though at the time he may win cheers from some because of his blind "courage" or his illusory "ideals." If he does not change his course, he will be a transient figure and suffer reverses. Whether in our history or during the 10-year period of turmoil, there are mirrors there for us to draw lessons from.

The mansion of the four modernizations needs lots of pillars, and pillars in turn need to put roots deep into the earth in order to grow. Our forefathers said: "A huge tree grows from a tiny seedling." Yes, the trunk of a huge tree grows from a tender sapling, but it cannot grow into useful timber without roots in the soil. Young people not only need to be farsighted, but should also plant their feet on solid ground so that they can, as tiny seedlings, reach maturity amidst the storms and attain useful talents in order to make greater contributions to construction of the four modernizations.

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## PARTY AND STATE

### ARTICLE DISCUSSES BUREAUCRACY UNDER SOCIALIST SYSTEM

Beijing ZHONGGUO QINGNIAN BAO in Chinese 7 Feb 81 p 3

[Article by Wong Hongchang [3769 3163 2490] and Liu Mengyi [0491 1123 5030]: "Is There A 'Bureaucratic Class' Within the Party?"]

[Text] Bureaucracy Is a Force Alien to the Socialist System

To prevent and overcome bureaucracy is a firm and unshakable policy of our party. After the founding of new China, the Central Committee of our party repeatedly emphasized the need to prevent and overcome bureaucracy and to grasp it as an important task to strengthen and improve party leadership. Since the Third Plenum of the 11th CCP Central Committee, in particular, the party Central Committee has taken a series of measures aimed at organizational and institutional adjustment and restructuring and has achieved notable results. But it would be completely wrong to confuse the bureaucratic phenomenon that is still unavoidable under the socialist system and the people's democratic dictatorship with the bureaucracy that served private property in the old society under the dictatorship of the landed bourgeoisie, or even to allege that within the party there is a "bureaucratic class." The reason is that the bureaucratic phenomenon found today is not inherent in the socialist social system based on public ownership of the means of production; on the contrary, it is a force alien to socialist public ownership and is the opposite of people's democratic dictatorship. It is extremely wrong and harmful both in theory and in practice to lose sight of this, that is, not to distinguish the difference in the essence of bureaucracy under two different social systems and to take phenomenon as substance and arbitrarily exaggerate the gravity of bureaucracy under the socialist system.

Marxism holds that as an ideology bureaucracy is the superstructure determined by a given economic base and serving a given economic base. There was no bureaucracy before the emergence of private property. Along with the genesis of private property, bureaucracy came into being to defend private property. In a slave society, the slave owners needed a corresponding bureaucratic political system to serve the economic interests of their class and to uphold the rule of a minority over the majority. Bureaucracy in feudal society originated from the feudal autocracy; it was rooted in the feudal economy and was dependent on the feudal state system for survival. In order to uphold their economic interests and their feudal autocratic rule, the landlord class and its general representative--the feudal

emperor--were necessarily required to oppress, exploit and rule the people through multiple levels of bureaucratic organizations and numerous bureaucrats. The bourgeoisie, while resolutely opposing the feudal landlord class, would never oppose private ownership and the dictatorship of a minority over the majority. For this reason, when the economic system and political system of the bourgeoisie were instituted, bureaucratic politics suited to the characteristics of capitalism came into being. To be sure, bureaucracy in capitalist society is much different in form and shape from bureaucracy in feudal society. This is because the bourgeoisie still has to wave the banner of democracy continuously in order to hoodwink the people. Consequently, they need a kind of bureaucracy which is more or less invisible and not easy to perceive. But bureaucracy, whether in feudal society or in capitalist society, will never change its essence, that is, upholding private ownership, exploitation and autocracy of a minority over the majority. Thus it can be seen that the contradiction between the old bureaucracy and the broad masses of working people is fundamentally antagonistic, and this cannot be resolved by the system of exploitation itself. It can only be resolved by antagonistic, violent armed revolution, by smashing the old state apparatus and overthrowing the old system of exploitation.

There are historical and practical reasons why bureaucratic phenomena cannot be eliminated right away under the socialist system and under the dictatorship of the proletariat. To begin with, the socialist society does not drop from the sky. It comes from the womb of the old society and necessarily bears remnants of the old society. New China has been built and developed on a semifeudal and semicolonial foundation. Although we have successfully carried out socialist revolution and socialist construction and have abolished private ownership, the centuries-old bureaucracy in the officialdom of old China cannot possibly disappear with the institution of the socialist system. It will exercise an evil influence like a specter in the political life of our country. Second, an economically backward state provides the soil for the survival and breeding of bureaucracy. Although agriculture was collectivized long ago, the state of manual labor has not fundamentally changed and the productive forces are still at a very low level. In the cities, the greater part of the factories are also technically backward and certain vestiges of small-scale production have not been completely eliminated. As Lenin point out, bureaucracy is "the superstructure of small producers' aversion to discipline and their lethargic state, and its economic root is "small producers' dispersion and aversion to discipline." ("Collected Works of Lenin," Vol 32, p 343) That is to say, as long as the productive forces are not developed to the utmost, as long as the backward economic state is not fundamentally changed, it is out of the question to talk about complete elimination of the bureaucratic phenomenon. Third, the leadership system, economic administrative system and cadre system of our party and state still have some defects. This plus the backward state of our nation's education, science and technology keep us from strengthening and perfecting the democratic system and legal system and give bureaucracy an opportunity to survive and develop.

Thus it is clear that the bureaucracy found in the socialist system is not caused by the socialist system itself. On the contrary, it is a force alien to the socialist system and is a phenomenon that will gradually be eliminated. It is precisely because of this that under the conditions of a powerful people's democratic dictatorship, those contradictions with the broad masses of working people

are, generally speaking, nonantagonistic and are contradictions among the people. They should be resolved certainly not by throwing overboard the socialist system itself but by continuously perfecting the socialist system. With the constant development of the productive forces, with the raising of the scientific and cultural levels of the entire Chinese nation, and with the strengthening and perfecting of socialist democracy and the legal system, the bureaucratic practices still found at present will gradually be lessened.

#### The Theory That "There Is A Bureaucratic Class" Is Absurd

To depict the bureaucratic phenomenon found under the socialist system as the existence of a "bureaucratic class" is not only not in line with objective reality in our country but also theoretically contrary to the basic principle of Marxism. The fundamental Marxist concept of class refers to differences in economic status, which it takes as the criterion for class differentiation. In other words, under given social conditions, the owners of the means of production and how these means are used manifest themselves as economic status and political positions of different classes. Our state eliminated private ownership, exploitation and the exploiting classes long ago and set up a socialist society in which the means of production are owned by the working class and the broad masses of working people; in the process of social production, the relations between people, while doing different types of work, are no longer relations between the exploiter and the exploited but comradely relations of mutual aid and cooperation. Our state organs and administrative personnel neither own the means of production nor practice exploitation; although some of them have "bureaucratic airs" and are privileged to a certain degree, how can they be represented as a "bureaucratic class" serving private ownership?

On the basis of the Marxist approach to class analysis, Lenin went a step further and pointed out the relations among the masses, classes and political parties. Lenin held that in class society the masses are divided into classes which are generally led by political parties. In modern society in particular, a political party always belongs to a definite class and serves the fundamental interests of a definite class. There has never been an instance in which a class belonged to a political party. The political party of the proletariat represents the fundamental interests of the working class and the broad masses of working people. Its genesis and development cannot be separated from the working class and the broad masses of working people for a single moment. The Communist Party of China is the outstanding representative of China's working class and the broad masses of working people: this has been borne out time and again by 10 years of history. As the masses have learned from practice, without the Chinese Communist Party there is no new China; without the Chinese Communist Party there is no socialism; without the Chinese Communist Party, the four modernizations cannot be achieved. It is contrary to the aspirations and knowledge of the working class and the working people to turn upside down the relationship between the class and the political party and to fabricate a "class" within the Chinese Communist Party, and to use this tactic to oppose and do away with the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party.

In fact, "bureaucrats" formed only a part of the ruling class even under the old social system. These bureaucrats could not go against the interests of the entire

ruling class, nor did they have economic interests of their own. In feudal society, for example, the landlord class was the ruling class, but the "bureaucrats" in power were only a small part of the landlord class, and these people could not go against the fundamental interests of the landlord class in words and deeds, for if they did, they would be driven away. Under the condition of people's democratic dictatorship (that is, the dictatorship of the proletariat), bureaucracy is a reflection of nonproletarian ideology in the revolutionary ranks and is condemned by the majority of people in the society. Realistically, there are indeed unhealthy tendencies within the party and there are a small number of leading cadres who are privileged. To oppose bureaucracy is justified. But it must be noted that individual phenomena should not be taken as universal phenomena, partial things cannot be magnified into the whole and universality; by no means do all party members or the majority of party members have unhealthy tendencies, by no means are all or the majority of leading cadres privileged and bureaucratic in practice, and there is not and there cannot be a so-called "bureaucratic class."

### Bearing in Mind Lessons of History

In this respect we have received profound lessons. During the 10-year period of calamity the Lin Biao and Jiang Qing counterrevolutionary cliques, in their attempt to subvert the people's democratic dictatorship, usurp party leadership and seize power, treated people guilty of bureaucracy in varying degrees in the same way as they did class enemies. They brutally persecuted as members of a "bureaucratic class" numerous good cadres who forged close ties with the masses and were in touch with reality. With ulterior motives they put forward reactionary slogans, "great cultural revolution" resolves the "contradiction between new cultural revolution and old government," "smash public security, procuratorial and legal organs." All those who were "senior officials" before the cultural revolution, from the chairman of the state down to team group leaders and production team chiefs, whatever their "official" posts, were labelled "black line personages," "bureaucratic class" and "capitalist roaders" and were all struck down, discredited and stamped underfoot. The result was that good people were humiliated, bad individuals were in power, feudal autocracy was rampant and the future of our party and state was almost forfeited. It can thus be seen what are the grave consequences of arbitrarily turning into contradictions between the enemy and ourselves the problems of bureaucracy that could be resolved through the socialist system itself and problems that fall in the category of contradictions among the people and of waging "brutal struggle and launching ruthless attack."

In combating bureaucracy we must set proper limits for action, that is, we must be realistic and practical. Stalin once pointed out: "If the struggle against bureaucracy in our state organs is waged to the extent of destroying the state organs, sweeping their prestige into the dust and attempting to topple them, this would be counter to Marxism-Leninism and would mean forgetting that our organs are socialist organs and state organs of the highest order among all state organs in the world." ("Collected Works of Stalin," Vol 10, p 273) This is what the Lin Biao and Jiang Qing counterrevolutionary cliques did. A small number of people who desire to see the world plunged into chaos are singing the same old tune-- "There is a bureaucratic class within the party"--with the ultimate aim of toppling

our party and state organs. Every fair-minded man has seen that the party Central Committee has done a great deal of work to overcome bureaucracy since the Third Plenum of the 11th CCP Central Committee and has achieved notable results. But it is not possible to resolve in a short time all the problems accumulated over the years. A thorough solution to the problem will take time and will go through a work process. All Communist Party members and revolutionary comrades should steadfastly march forward under the unified leadership of the party Central Committee. As long as we adhere to party leadership and uphold the socialist road, people's democratic dictatorship, Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong thought, keep perfecting socialist democracy and the legal system, vigorously increase our productive forces and, with one heart and mind, do a good job in readjusting the national economy, bureaucracy in our ranks will certainly be overcome step by step and will eventually be eliminated altogether with the progress of the socialist cause.

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## PARTY AND STATE

### VOLUME I OF CHOU'S WORKS STRESSES IDEOLOGY, POLITICS

Tianjin TIANJIN RIBAO in Chinese 3 Feb 81 p 3

[Article by Jin Jian [6855 0256]: 'We Must Put Ideological and Political Work in an Important Place; Reading Volume I of 'Selected Works of Zhou Enlai''']

[Text] Our party has always paid attention to ideological and political work. Many revolutionaries of the older generation summed up rich experiences in their long revolutionary practice, and Comrade Zhou Enlai was an outstanding representative among them. Articles collected in Volume I of the "Selected Works of Zhou Enlai," such as "Resolutely Eliminate Nonproletarian Ideas Within Our Party," "A Directive Letter from the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party to the Front Committee of the 4th Army of the Red Army," "Political Work Among Troops in the War of Resistance," "Unite the Vast Ranks of the Masses of People and Forge Ahead Together," etc, are important documents discoursing on party leadership and ideological and political work. These discourses have played a tremendous role in directing and promoting revolutionary work in our history. Today they are still a powerful weapon for us to strengthen and improve party leadership and realize the four modernizations.

#### Ideological and Political Work Is the Central Link for Realizing Party Leadership

How can we realize party leadership? What are the tasks and functions of party leadership organs and political organs? These were not at all clear when the Red Army was first established, and there were even controversies. In September 1929, Comrade Zhou Enlai clearly pointed out the answers to these questions in his directive letter to the Front Committee of the 4th Army on behalf of the Party Central Committee. In the proletarian revolutionary undertakings led by the party there existed "the party system, the army system, the government system," and so forth. These systems were both connected with and different from one another. The party and Government could not be inseparable, and the party and army could not be inseparable. The party was the leader of all the systems, but the party could not grab everything and control everything. Said Comrade Zhou Enlai: "The slogan 'The Party Controls Everything' makes no sense, whether in principle or in fact; the party can provide political leadership only through the functioning of party organizations." Hence, he directed the Front Committee of the 4th Army of the Red Army "not to command troops directly" and "not to tamper with ordinary administrative matters" but to "properly keep sight of leadership over the Red Army's political, military, economic and mass struggles." ("A

Directive Letter from the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party to the Front Committee of the Fourth Army of the Red Army") This directive not only pointed out the direction of work for the Front Committee of the 4th Army of the Red Army but, more importantly, it also made clear to the whole party that party leadership was, in the main, ideological and political leadership.

In order to realize ideological and political leadership, we must put ideological and political work in an important place. Apart from exercising control over principles and policies and deciding on the utilization of important cadres, party organizations and leading organs at various levels must allocate their principal time and energy to doing ideological and political work, to working with people, and to working with the masses, because without active and effective political education and ideological motivation, without the vanguard and model roles of the vast ranks of the party members, the party's line, principles and policies will not be able to be carried out thoroughly, and the party's political leadership will not be able to be realized. Just as Comrade Mao Zedong pointed out: "Mastering ideological education is the central link for uniting the whole party to proceed with political struggle. If this task is not solved, the party's political tasks will not all be accomplished." Historical experience has also proved that, whether our revolutionary cause has developed exuberantly or suffered setbacks, and whatever the changes that have taken place in our revolutionary situation and tasks, as long as the party has been able to strengthen its political leadership, formulate the correct line, principles and policies, and actively do a good job of ideological and political work, it has usually been able to unite the masses to win new victories with one heart and one mind. For instance, after the failure of the Great Revolution and up to the early period of the second civil revolutionary war, because of the influence of the white terror perpetrated by the Kuomintang and the party's erroneous line, ideas within the party were diffused and various nonproletarian ideologies began to spread and seriously affect the fighting stamina of the Red Army. As head of the Central Organization Department and secretary of the Military Commission at the time, Comrade Zhou Enlai pointed out to the whole party through the Party Central Committee that we had to resolutely eliminate nonproletarian ideas and oppose erroneous political tendencies and organizational tendencies. He also directed the Front Committee of the 4th Army of the Red Army to firmly oppose the liquidation concept, the dispersion concept, the tendency toward extreme democratization on the part of small groups, and other erroneous ideas. He thereby succeeded in eliminating ideological obstacles, united the whole party and the whole army, and quickly consolidated and developed the Red Army and our countryside revolutionary bases, and a new situation soon emerged in the Chinese revolution. In 1936 and 1937, when we were in a transition from the civil war to the war of resistance, and when the war of resistance actually got started, ideological problems again multiplied. In order to unite to resist Japan, Comrade Zhou Enlai directed the whole party to pay attention to ideological and political work. He recalled the "historical miracles" of our victory over powerful enemies following the Great Revolution, and he explained that an important reason that these miracles had occurred was because "firm revolutionary political work had been done among our revolutionary troops." He clearly pointed out: "Revolutionary political work based on revolutionism is the lifeline and soul of all revolutionary troops." ("Political Work Among the Troops in the War of Resistance") This scientific dictum not only enriched the proletarian theory of military buildup, but also had a general

significance in guiding us to carry out our various tasks well in revolution and construction.

#### **Ideological and Political Work Must Be Carried Out in Conjunction With Other Tasks**

This question is discussed in several places in Volume I of the "Selected Works of Zhou Enlai." Comrade Zhou Enlai pointed out: "Political education must be emphasized together with military education." When we proceed with our political work, "we must not create a situation of confrontation between military affairs and politics; we must not create incompatibility"; "we must not just put forward general political slogans, but should carefully seek to understand the needs of the masses in their daily life, and guide the masses from their struggles in daily life to political struggle and armed struggle." ("A Directive Letter From the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party to the Front Committee of the 4th Army of the Red Army") This means that ideological and political work is not isolated. It must be carried out together with other work and combined with looking after the life of the masses and solving the practical problems of the masses. Because political work is closely related to the central tasks of various periods, man's ideas are also often a reflection of the problems in man's practical work and life. If ideological and political work cannot effectively promote man's work and the solution of man's practical problems, ideological and political work will lose its persuasiveness and its appeal and will not be able to demonstrate its power. During the early period of the anti-Japanese war, some of the Kuomintang troops said our political work was empty talk, or quack medicine sales talk. On the one hand, Comrade Zhou Enlai solemnly criticized such odd utterances as having the intention of "finding fault with political work." He considered those people as "either uninformed on the actual meaning of political work, or purposely antagonistic toward political work among the troops," and he pointed out: "The reason political work is sometimes alleged to be empty talk is definitely not that there is anything wrong with political work itself, but because political workers have not been carrying out genuine revolutionary political work." On the other hand he also pointed out, by way of seeking truth from facts, that if political work becomes dislocated from other work and "turns into decorative, joking, flattering measures," and especially if it becomes "incapable of being closely connected to the improvement of soldiers' living conditions and treatment," "then this kind of political work is bound to turn into empty talk, into quack medicine sales talk." Hence, Comrade Zhou Enlai required that military units adopt various cultural and physical education measures, develop cultural and recreational activities, assure the troops of their provisions and improve their food, and distribute comforting gifts mainly to lower level cadres and soldiers, so as to "let the officers and men have a pleasant exciting life: and join the battle with ebullience.

Of course, when we solve the living conditions, treatment, and practical problems of the masses, we still cannot relax our ideological and political work. We must retrain the words and deeds of Communist Party members and advanced elements with communist ideology and moral education; advocate the spirit of wholehearted service to the people, subordination of individuals to groups, and selflessness and altruism instead of selfishness; fear neither hardships nor

death; and oppose various erroneous tendencies. For instance, during the early period of the second revolutionary civil war, some party members resorted to "the practice of asking for money whenever they do any work, and refraining from doing anything if they get no money," and some "always look to the party for solving their problems of livelihood" instead of going among the masses to do the party's work. Here, Comrade Zhou Enlai solemnly pointed out: Such "hired-hand revolutionary mentality" and such ideas of "taking the party as a relief association" are "serious mistakes" and are therefore "far more than several thousand li removed" from the party's character and tasks." ("Resolutely Eliminate Nonproletarian Ideas Within the Party") He required that organizations at various levels strengthen political education among party members and resolutely eliminate the influence of such nonproletarian ideas.

Comrade Zhou Enlai not only discussed the relationship between ideological and political work and other work theoretically, but he also undertook to exemplify it by his own conduct and become our model. He earnestly helped comrades, including progressive personages outside the party, in politics and meticulously looked after their living conditions. When people's educator Mr Tao Xingzhi [7118 5887 4249] became fatally ill in Shanghai in 1946, [Chou] immediately took a trip to see him. When he learned that Mr Tao had died of fatigue and exhaustion, he immediately sent a telegram to the Party Central Committee suggesting that "from now on we must take the responsibility of protecting the safety and health of our progressive friends," "provide them with more economic and material assistance in terms of relief, and also look after them from time to time politically." ("We Should Take Better Care of Our Progressive Friends") The lofty character of Comrade Zhou Enlai in sharing pleasure as well as hardships and undergoing all adversities with the masses is forever a model for us to emulate.

#### **Ideological and Political Work Depends on Exemplification by Leaders at Various Levels**

When the work of our party suffers setbacks and encounters difficulties, and when the reputation of ideological and political work goes down, the proper way of proceeding with our ideological and political work under such circumstances constitutes a still more severe test for every leading cadre and political worker. In his article "How To Be a Good Leader," Comrade Zhou Enlai took into consideration the state of mind of certain cadres in being apprehensive about "exposing their own weaknesses, damaging their prestige as leaders, or shaking their own self-confidence" and pointed out: "The prestige of a leader is enhanced not through concealment of his mistakes but through correction of his mistakes, and is fostered not through self-trumpeting but through single-minded hard work. One's confidence in one's work can only become enhanced, not weakened, after such mistakes are corrected. Only those who indulge in vain glory and seek to save face would be afraid of exposing their mistakes!" This clearly tells us: Whether in the case of a collective or in the case of an individual, being encumbered by faults and mistakes is not in itself to be feared; the correct attitude is the courage to expose them and earnestly correct them. Only thus can one earn the people's trust and avoid losing one's prestige. Only by single-minded hard work, exemplification, and going through thick and thin

together with the masses can one secure the people's support. Only by learning lessons from mistakes and ascertaining the clear direction for one's advances can one enhance one's self-confidence. And only thus will all of us avoid becoming "mutually reproachful, mutually skeptical," and lax in our fighting will. In this regard, Comrade Zhou Enlai is even more of a model for us to emulate. Throughout his life he was diligent, selfless, and willing to take the burden of his office. He scored great achievements on behalf of the party and the people. On many crucial occasions he struggled against erroneous trends from a correct standpoint. But owing to his unlimited loyalty to the party and the people, he was also able to honestly broach the occasional mistakes which occurred in his leadership work and thereby make them instructive to everybody. Such an aboveboard, self-disciplined, lofty character is forever worthy of emulation by leading cadres at various levels.

Education through personal exemplification is far more important than education by words. In order to enhance the prestige of our ideological and political work, we must give scope to the model role of all our personnel in political work, including leading cadres at various levels, through exemplification. Comrade Zhou Enlai pointed out: "Personnel in political work must themselves be able to serve as models for all officers and men ideologically and politically, be loyal to their revolutionary spirit, and influence all officers and men with an indefatigable will and a hardworking, patient workstyle, as well as unite all officers and men with a humble and friendly attitude and an imperturbably persuasive spirit. Only thus can they enhance the prestige of our political work, propel our political work forward, and develop the effectiveness of our political work." "All unbecoming inclinations toward arrogance, showing off, empty talk, and corrupt lifestyles must be overcome and eliminated." ("Political Work Among Troops in the War of Resistance")

Naturally, if only the leaders make efforts and the basic-level organizations and the vast ranks of party members fail to play their part, our ideological and political work cannot be done well. Therefore, Comrade Zhou Enlai said: "Political propaganda and agitation and organization of the masses can be done in a penetrating way only by party branches; daily struggles can be flexibly led only by party branches." ("Resolutely Eliminate Nonproletarian Ideas Within the Party") For this reason, he paid great attention to the building of party branches and held that the duties of party branches were "by no means limited to holding meetings to hear political reports and submitting party dues. The most important duty is to discuss local political problems and problems in work." Party branches must "understand actual situations," and "correctly apply the party's policies," so as to give scope to the core effect of the branches and the vanguard and model role of party members.

#### **Ideological and Political Work Must Resort to Persuasion, Flexibility, Versatility**

This is the correct principle on the part of Comrade Zhou Enlai in endeavoring to promote and adhere to our party's leadership over ideological and political work. As for the simplistic workstyle of "considering the job done once slogans are posted, and considering that to be enough, and becoming disappointed when obstacles are encountered and becoming complacent when work happens to go

smoothly;" as for the arbitrary workstyle of suppressing freedom of expression; as for the formalism and religious rituals in political education which fail to arouse the interest of officers and men in the study of problems; as for the metaphysical idea of appraising people by stereotypes, without realizing that people are liable to change; as for the rude workstyle of regarding oneself as always being right, of imposing one's own wishes on others, of giving coercive directives, and of being overanxious to see results; as for the isolationist method of neglecting to unite the majority and working only in small circles, and so forth: he was firmly opposed to all such erroneous methods which tend to hamper ideological and political work. He maintained that the only correct attitude and principle in doing a good job of ideological and political work are "an imperturbably persuasive and inductive spirit" and the "adoption of flexible ways."

Why should we only try to persuade and not suppress? Comrade Zhou Enlai pointed out, first of all: The way the party leads the masses and the way the party exerts internal leadership are different. The party is the vanguard of the proletariat; it represents the interests of the masses of the people. There is no difference between those above and those below in the relationship between the party and the vast ranks of the masses: "The method and the attitude of leading the masses must be such that they do not feel we are leading them," but that we are relying on them to carry out our work: this is the best leadership. Especially when the masses are still not sufficiently aware or still do not understand the party's principles and policies and the intentions of the leadership at the higher level, we must go through the process of education and persuasion, and sometimes even through the process of waiting. Only thus, when the leadership and the masses have achieved mutual trust in practice, can they unite to accomplish the tasks of revolution. Secondly, Comrade Zhou Enlai proceeded from our approach to treating ideological freedom to explain the reason why, in ideological and political work, we can only induce and guide but not suppress. He pointed out: "In our new democratic state, the masses of people enjoy freedom of thought. With the sole exception of reactionary ideas, all ideas are allowed to exist." ("Learn From Mao Zedong") We ought to believe that the vast ranks of the masses are capable of gradually accepting progressive ideas. Consequently, Comrade Zhou Enlai required personnel engaged in political work not to force people immediately to accept an ideology when they proceed with political education, but to seek truth and discover truth through discussion and debate, and to let people gradually accept truth. He maintained: "Only thus is ours an educational attitude, a leadership attitude, and an attitude of working together, an attitude of cooperation." ("Learn From Mao Zedong")

Although Comrade Zhou Enlai's discourses on ideological and political work deal with the experiences of the period of democratic revolution, they reflect the general laws of revolutionary ideological and political work and hence are still applicable today. We should take Comrade Zhou Enlai as our example, improve and strengthen our ideological and political work under the leadership of the party, stimulate the revolutionary enthusiasm of the vast ranks of the masses, overcome difficulties, and promote the steady progress of our socialist modernization enterprises.

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## SOCIOLOGICAL, EDUCATION AND CULTURAL

### GOVERNMENT TAKES STRONG MEASURES AGAINST ETHNIC, RELIGIOUS MINORITIES

Tehran SOBH-E AZADEGAN in Persian 18 Feb 81 p 5

[Article translated from the foreign press]

[Text] China has suddenly expressed its extreme interest in Islam! The Chinese press exaggerates the "happy life of the Islamic peoples in China" in every propaganda article and radio broadcast abroad, particularly those messages it sends to Muslim countries. These peoples are the "Dungans", Uighurs, Kazakhs, Uzbeks, Kirghiz, Tajiks and others. Mention is not made of what happened not so long ago, meaning the disgraces to Muslim pilgrimage centers during the course of Mao's "Cultural Revolution" and the harsh treatment of the followers of Islam in the "Muslim regions," such as the autonomous region of Xinjiang Uygur and the states of Hubei, Henan, Yunnan and Qinghai.

Similarly there is no lack of propaganda about the friendly relations between these peoples and the Hans (Chinese proper) in the far past. It seems that the leaders in Beijing are worried about nothing so much as the welfare of the Muslims. In any case, they use every opportunity to express their "sympathy" with the Muslims living in China, and in general with Muslims throughout the world. Mao's successors have really resorted to a more cautious policy in regard to ethnic and religious minorities. But in practice their insanely patriotic policy to absorb the non-Han (non-Chinese) peoples has remained without change.

Beijing has refused the right of self-determination to the non-Han peoples, including the Muslims. Not so long ago the publication HONG QI published a speech Zhou Enlai made in 1958. In this speech he did not consider the right of ethnic self-determination to be in harmony with "the country's historical situation." The autonomous administrative framework that was set up for the non-Han peoples was basically a "myth," because the effective positions remained in the hands of Han officials. Chinese immigrants attack these regions, while the native populations are driven to distant, sparsely-populated regions.

Xinjiang Uygur, where until recently this Uighurs made up the definite majority of the population in a region of several other ethnic groups, is a good example to study. Owen Lattimore, a U.S. sinologists, who inspected the autonomous region of Xinjiang Uygur at the beginning of the 1970's, pointed out that the number of Uighurs fell from 80 percent of the population in 1949 to 50 percent in 1973, while the number of Chinese rose from 200,000 to 2.8 million. Other sources have

stated the present Chinese population of Xinjiang as 6 million. The English newspaper THE FINANCIAL TIMES recently reported that Beijing intends to increase the population of the states on the northwestern border to 100 million persons. This means that the Uighurs are confronted with the possibility of being reduced to a minority that can be ignored in its own territory.

The course of the forcible absorption of the non-Han Chinese peoples, whom the Beijing leaders intend to deprive of their history and national identity by preventing any growth of their culture, continues to move quickly. Elizabeth Chang, a correspondent for the FRENCH NEWS AGENCY, writes that it is not accidental that Chinese officials set the figure for the Muslim population 20 to 30 million lower than the number that was observed to live in China not so long ago.

The best proof of the Beijing leaders' method of patriotic persecution of the Muslim peoples and other non-Chinese peoples, is the propagandizing of the meaningless, unscientific idea of "one united China." GUANGMING RIBAO not so long ago stated: "From the time the country was founded uniting several feudal peoples through the past 2,000 years, China has existed as one country of several peoples.... The Manchus, Moghuls, Uighurs, Tibetans, Miaos, Yaos, the Genwangs and many other peoples linked with the Hans (Chinese) have made up the country of China. They were part of China from very ancient times, even before the founding of the Qing empire and the territories in which they dwelled." In Beijing's propaganda, the patriotic claims of Chiang Kai-shek are continuously repeated, which are based on the idea that all the non-Han peoples (non-Chinese) "are branches from the sole same China." In practice, this policy appears as the belittling of the languages, religions and customs of the non-Han peoples. In 1975, the "Dungan" Muslims in the province of Yunnan rose to protest being prohibited from following their religious customs. The weekly journal ASIA WEEK, published in Hong Kong, reported that authorities reacted with vicious repression. Hundreds of Muslims were killed.

Growing persecution of the Muslims in Yunnan has also been reported recently. This time, Muslims were punished! for going to mosques because, in the view of the authorities, going to the mosque sabotages "the active participation of Muslims in production."

The present Chinese leaders are striving to create the impression that they are opening a new chapter in their relations with Muslims. But it is hardly possible that they will succeed.

9397

CSO: 4906

GOAL BEYOND 'TRUTHFULNESS' IN WRITING STRESSED

Shanghai JIEFANG RIBAO in Chinese 13 Feb 81 p 4

[Article by Zeng Wenyuan (2582 2429 3220): "Writing Truthfully Is Not Just For The Purpose Of 'Truthfulness'"]

[Text] In the past few years, I have seen in certain literary journals various discussions on the question of truthfulness in literature. Among them an important point of contention was: truthfulness is the life of art. If this means an emphasis on giving scope to the tradition of revolutionary realism and a proposition that literary work should proceed from objective realities and truthfully reflect social life, then it is entirely correct. The important reason why the fine works in literary history last so long without losing their appeal and are appreciated and passed on for ages is precisely because they truthfully reflect social realities, profoundly reveal the contradictions that actually exist in life, and have conveyed the voices of hundreds and thousands of masses. Contrariwise, those works which distort realities, no matter how their authors attempt to disguise them or how others might trumpet for them, are ultimately discarded by history and repudiated by the masses. The literature based on "concealment" and "deception" during the period when the "gang of four" held sway was of this kind.

Some say that "truthfulness is the life of art" is a statement made by Lev Tolstoy; others say that this statement was made by Lu Xun. Indeed, both Tolstoy and Lu Xun made statements similar to this. But both Tolstoy and Lu Xun merely took truthfulness as a basic condition for artistic creation; to them, without truthfulness, artistic creation would lose its life. Yet, neither of them really went as far as some have speculated today--that with truthfulness, artistic creation seems to have everything; that "writing truthfully" thus becomes the entire aim of artistic creation; and that the duty and responsibility of an author consist merely of "writing truthfully."

In his "On Art," Tolstoy defined literature and made an analysis as to the characteristics of artistic creation. He pointed out: So-called artistic activity is nothing other than the activity of an artist in recalling in his mind the feelings he once experienced, and thereby making them reappear through the images he conveys by actions, lines, colors, voices and language so as to enable others also to experience the same feelings and be affected by them. In

Tolstoy's view, in conveying the feelings he himself has experienced, the aim of the artist is to "substitute good, necessary feelings for man's happiness for baseful, not so good, and unnecessary feelings for man's happiness." He said: "The mission of art lies herein." In stressing that artistic creation must reflect an artist's genuine feelings, Tolstoy was correct, but it was incorrect for him to take art as a reflection merely of feelings but not of ideas. On this, Pu-lie-hen-no-fu offered his criticism and an additional opinion. Pu-lie-hen-no-fu expressed profound agreement with Tolstoy regarding the latter's view of looking at art as a means for achieving man's progress and happiness, but he thought Tolstoy had failed to point out clearly that the feelings conveyed in artistic creation are the effects of an artist's experiences in realistic life, and that those feelings are expressed through "definite images." (In "A Letter Without an Address") This indicates that in both Tolstoy's and Pu-lie-hen-no-fu's view, whether an artist conveys his feelings or reflects realistic life, neither of these is the ultimate aim of art but merely a means.

As a great revolutionary, thinker, and writer, Lu Xun in particular consciously connected artistic activity to the liberation struggle of our people. As early as 1925, he had already appealed to writers to "honestly, penetratingly, and daringly observe and absorb life and write out its flesh and blood." In the meantime, he also pointed out: "Literature is the flame emanating from our national spirit, and also a lamp guiding the future of our national spirit." ("On Opening Our Eyes To See") Lu Xun at first studied medicine, but eventually he turned around to engage in literary activity. His aim was nothing more than wishing to change our national spirit by making use of literature to save the motherland from crises. After Lu Xun became a Marxist, he even more clearly expounded the relationship between literature and social life in pointing out that a writer was first to "sensitively describe society" and then to "turn around to influence society." He also pointed out that proletarian revolutionary literature was "a wing of the proletarian liberation struggle"; it should "help the revolution to deepen and develop," and definitely not otherwise. Lu Xun was opposed both to false literature and to the various erroneous and harmful ideas reflected in literature. He maintained that literary works must pertain to "true life, vigorous struggle, a lively pulse, ideas and enthusiasm, etc." ("On Our Present-Day Literary Movement") In Lu Xun's view, literary works should truthfully reflect social life and at the same time embody profound ideas and a strong spirit--a manifest spirit of the time. It may be said that Lu Xun struggled for literary truthfulness and thoughtfulness throughout his life.

The realism we advocate is a realism with ideals. It requires a writer not to transcribe reality mechanically or to copy life, but to observe and analyze life from the advanced ideological level of the time, to profoundly reveal the essence of life and its laws of development, and to demonstrate the author's advanced esthetic ideals while reflecting life. It should enthusiastically praise the advanced personalities and advanced events in life, describe great achievements and lofty values exemplified by the masses of the people in revolution and in construction, but not gloss over realities or conceal contradictions. It may expose the ugly things in life and whip the reactionary, backward conservative forces that hinder the progress of history, but it should

not make people feel pessimistic or discouraged, disheartened or dispirited, or bereft of their confidence in the future after reading the works. All writers are engaged in artistic creation for some purpose. All writers in history have expressed this or that kind of attitude toward social life through their creative works, affirming something or negated something; none ever "wrote truthfully" just for the sake of "writing truthfully." Precisely because of this, when Gorky spoke of the truthfulness of literature he always combined it with the aim and task of literature and put before people such questions as "What is truthfulness?" "Why is truthfulness required?" "What kind of truthfulness is required?" ("A Chat With Young Members of the Shock Brigade Entering Literary Circles"), so as to arouse the people to reflect.

Socialist literature is a component of the revolutionary cause led by the party; it carries with it the lofty mission of fostering socialist new people. It should prove helpful toward people's efforts to elevate their political consciousness and toward the fostering of people's lofty values. This lofty mission is also readily taken on by solemn, responsible writers. During an earlier period, some comrades confused the means and the purpose of artistic creation when they discussed "truthfulness." Hence, perhaps it is not superfluous to mention once again the aim of creation.

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CSO: 4005

SOCIOLOGICAL, EDUCATION AND CULTURE

RESOLUTION ON NATIONALITY POLICY ADMINISTRATION ADOPTED IN SICHUAN

Chengdu SICHUAN RIBAO in Chinese 23 Nov 80 p 1

[Article: "Resolution Adopted by the Standing Committee of the Sichuan Provincial People's Congress Concerning the Inspection Group Work Report on Nationality Policy Administration (the Seventh Standing Committee Section Resolution by the Fifth Provincial People's Congress on 20 November 1980)"]

[Text] At the seventh session of the standing committee of the Sichuan Provincial People's Congress, the participants listened to the work report on the provincial administration of the nationality policy made by the Deputy Chief Liu Xing [0491 2502] of the inspection group. The inspection group of the Sichuan Provincial Nationality Policy Administration toured 49 counties and autonomous counties of three autonomous prefectures (Garze Tibetan, Aba Tibetan, and Liangshan Yi) to inspect the administration of the nationality policy. The inspection group listened to opinions from the nationality cadres and masses, and studied the party's reeducation work on nationality policy together with the prefecture and county cadres. In addition, the group studied approaches to further develop economic construction and cultural education tasks in the nationality areas. The standing committee session expressed satisfaction with the work of the inspection group.

The inspection group expressed valuable opinions about preserving and respecting the nationality rights of regional autonomy, and vigorous selection and training of nationality cadres. The group suggested drafting flexible policy and economic measures, as well as speeding up economic and cultural construction, based on actual situations in the nationality areas. The related departments of the Sichuan Provincial People's Government will seriously study these problems.

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**SOCIOLOGICAL, EDUCATION AND CULTURE**

**SHANGHAI, ZHEJIANG TO FURTHER SUPPORT CULTURAL CONSTRUCTION IN NINGXIA**

Beijing GUANGMING RIBAO in Chinese 2 Jan 81 p 1

[Article: "Shanghai and Zhejiang Decide To Give Greater Support to Ningxia's Cultural Construction:]

[Text] As reported on 1 January by GUANGMING RIBAO, beginning from 1981 Shanghai and Zhejiang agreed to give greater support to cultural construction in the Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region.

Institutions of higher learning in Shanghai will send a number of experienced teachers to lecture in Ningxia schools. At the same time, institutions of higher learning in Ningxia will send teachers to Shanghai for advanced study and students to attend classes. In addition, Shanghai will supply Ningxia with textbooks for schools of higher learning, reference data, teaching films, specimens and instruments (built by Shanghai schools) for teaching and research. In general education, Shanghai will dispatch 50 secondary-school teachers (as the first group) to Shizuishan Municipality in Ningxia for a 2-year teaching term. In summer, experienced leading cadres and high-caliber teachers of Shanghai primary and secondary schools will be sent to Ningxia to transmit their experience of teaching. In public health and physical education, Shanghai also will support Ningxia by arranging for advanced study training facilities and reference materials.

The project of cultural education in Ningxia supported by Zhejiang Province included assistance in training certified kindergarten teachers, advanced study for public-health professionals, and transfer of teaching experience by highly qualified teachers and athletic coaches in Zhejiang's primary and secondary schools.

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## SOCIOLOGICAL, EDUCATION AND CULTURE

### SICHUAN PEOPLE'S CONGRESS STANDING COMMITTEE DISCUSSES NATIONALITY POLICY

Chengdu SICHUAN RIBAO in Chinese 23 Nov 80 p 1

[Article by Peng Guangbing [1756 0342 3521], a Sichuan radio station reporter and Mao Shuren [3029 1859 0086], a SICHUAN RIBAO reporter: "The Seventh Standing Committee Session of the Sichuan Provincial People's Congress; Listening to Transmitted Reports of Second Nationality Committee Session and the 16th Standing Committee Session of the National People's Congress; Listening to Inspection Group Work Report To Carry out Sichuan's Nationality Policy; and Resolutions"]

[Text] The Seventh Standing Committee Session of the Sichuan Provincial People's Congress was held from 17-20 November.

At this session, the delegates further studied the implementation of the spirit of the third session of the Fifth National People's Congress, listened to Vice Chairman Li Zhongyi [2621 0022 0001] of the standing committee of the Sichuan Provincial People's Congress regarding the transmission of the spirit of the second nationality committee session and the 16th standing committee session of the National People's Congress, and listened to the inspection group work report delivered by its Vice Chairman Liu Xing [0491 2502] about carrying out nationality policy in Sichuan Province. Several appropriate resolutions were passed. Also passed at the session were personnel appointments and removals, as well as cases reported by the Provincial Higher People's Court and the Provincial Higher People's Procuratorate.

At the session, based on the spirit of the third session of the Fifth National People's Congress and the provincial party committee work conference, the delegates engaged in serious discussions of problems in strengthening and improving standing committee work of the Provincial People's Congress. They must raise the level of their understanding of the nature, functions, and power and missions of the standing committee of the National People's Congress. The people's congress system is the fundamental system in our country; this is also the fundamental form by which the people control their country. The people's congress standing committee is a work organ and power organ. According to authorities assigned by the Constitution and based on Sichuan's actual situation and practical needs, the standing committee prescribes certain local laws and temporary regulations. At present, emphasis should be on local laws concerning nationalities and the economy. We must stress investigation and study and grasp the actual situation. According to plans, we must go down to the lower level to investigate and understand the situation and inspect in order to strengthen contacts with delegates of the provincial people's congress.

We must listen to opinions from the delegates and masses to improve our work. The provincial people's congress standing committee and the provincial election committee should strengthen their leadership and inspection in the county-level direct election tasks, the basis of good supervision of elections of political authorities at several levels. Direct elections are an important factor in legitimatizing political authorities. County-level direct elections also serve to educate the cadres and masses with the socialist democracy and legal system. We must inspect and supervise various levels of organizations and their leadership personnel for carrying out operations in strict compliance with the laws. We must seriously pursue and handle cases where laws are violated. In addition, we must strengthen the work organizations and systems of the provincial people's congress standing committee, for a stronger collective leadership.

Standing Committee Chairman Du Xinyuan [2629 1800 3293] of the Sichuan Provincial People's Congress spoke at the session. Attending the session were responsible comrades of the provincial people's government, the provincial higher people's court, and the provincial higher people's procuratorate.

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## SOCIOLOGICAL, EDUCATION AND CULTURE

### SICHUAN PARTY, GOVERNMENT ORGANS ATTEMPT TO COUNTERACT UNHEALTHY INFLUENCES

Beijing GUANGMING RIBAO in Chinese 28 Nov 80 p 1

[Article: "To Counteract Unhealthy Influences by Cadres Relocating Relatives From Rural Agricultural Residences to Urban Nonagricultural Residences"]

[Text] This year party and government organs at various levels in Sichuan Province are rectifying the cadres' violation of policy regulations of the Party Central Committee and the State Council; these cadres exerted unhealthy influences in relocating their dependents or relatives from rural agricultural residences to urban nonagricultural residences. Up to late September, those (numbering 1,036) violating the rural-to-urban transfer policy had their urban residences and food rations cancelled and for 918 others violating the hiring policy for cadres and workers were relieved of their respective positions. Among the provincial level leading cadres, there were 145 dependents or 76 percent of the total number of those relieved of their positions. This reversal of rural-to-urban transfer irregularities counteracts the unhealthy influences and thus satisfies the general public.

The Sichuan Provincial Party Committee has given much attention to cleaning up and correcting irregularities in rural-to-urban transfer practices. This spring the provincial party committee and people's government responded to requests from various circles and announced transfer irregularities will have to return to their original rural villages. Irregularities were checked household by household and person by person. At the same time, the provincial party committee assigned responsible persons to its discipline inspection commission to coordinate the task with the provincial Public Security Bureau and labor bureau and department of food. The committee established leading sections and offices of municipalities, regions, prefectures, counties and wards; a responsible comrade of a party committee was assigned this task. At the Third Plenum of the Third Provincial Party Committee in March, this residence transfer problem was discussed and resolutions were passed. In June and August, the provincial party committee approved and announced reports by the provincial discipline inspection commission regarding rectifying unhealthy irregularities of rural-to-urban transfers. The principal leading cadres of the provincial party committee met several times to discuss this problem. Therefore, the party committees at various levels considered correcting irregularities in work transfer as a task of regulating party discipline.

In the regulating work transfer Sichuan Province first put emphasis in the irregular transfer among dependents of leading cadres and then among dependents of other cadres.

This work pattern is called "focusing on leaders and then gradually down to the basic level." Comrade Secretary Wang Dingyi [3769 1353 0001] of the Hongya County Party Committee led the move to relieve his nephew of urban empooyment (with transfer irregularities) to return to his original rural village. Deputy Secretary Wang Yuquan [3769 5940 3123] of the county party committee also returned his wife and children to their village. Under their leadership, four department and bureau chairs also returned their dependents with irregularities to villages. In just a little over two months the irregular transfers were cleared up. The return of irregular transferees was brought about throughout the county with coordination and support at all levels. Work sections were organized by the provincial discipline inspection commission and other organizations to go to various counties in Fuling Prefecture for timely reports on the investigation and problems to the provincial party committee and on its support of the work sections. The irregular transfers in Fuling Prefecture were then straightened out. As of the end of September, 84 percent of irregular transferees in the prefecture had been returned. Thirdly, firm directives were drawn up regarding the timely study of policy problems while clearing up the irregular transfers. Fourthly, detailed ideological work was carried out to properly solve the returnees problems in work assignment and standard of living. For 12 cadre returnee-dependents ranked ward level and higher in Fuling County, the standing committee of the county party committee carried out ideological work. In addition, personnel were dispatched to rural communes and production brigades to settle returnees' problems in production and livelihood. It is estimated that by year's end the return of irregular transferees will be basically completed throughout Sichuan Province.

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## SOCIOLOGICAL, EDUCATION AND CULTURE

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### MINORITY CADRES BEING SELECTED, TRAINED IN LIANGSHAN YI AUTONOMOUS PREFECTURE

Chengdu SICHUAN RIBAO in Chinese 10 Jan 81 p 3

[Article by He Minghua [0149 2494 5478]: "Among Leadership Ranks From Commune to Prefecture, 54.6 Percent Are Cadres of Minority Nationalities"]

[Text] The various levels of party organizations in the Liangshan Yi Autonomous Prefecture actively trained and selected, by all possible means, the minority cadres to be promoted into leadership positions, thus enabling minority cadres to manage their own internal affairs.

In the autonomous prefecture, party organizations at various levels focused their attention on training minority cadres; the organizations considered the training and selection of minority cadres to be an important task. The party repeatedly revised its minority policy by concentrating on the erroneous concept of despising minority cadres during different periods of their selection and training. Thus, a work pattern was initiated at party organizations various levels to enthusiastically select and train minority cadres. At the same time, the organizations operated schools and/or short-term rotational training classes and also sent minority cadres to study outside the prefecture; thus, they could learn culture, scientific technology, management, administration and political theory to gain a broader background. The Han nationality cadres in several positions also trained their minority counterparts in passing on experiences, helping and guiding them like old hands with new hands and teachers with pupils. Responsible work was assigned to minority cadres for independent and courageous handling of work problems.

Through these abovementioned approaches, the autonomous prefecture has trained a number of capable minority cadres with ideological awareness. Among four levels of leadership cadres from commune to prefecture, the number of minority cadres accounted for 54.6 percent of all cadres. These minority cadres are in their prime of life with good strength, hard working attitudes, and closely identify with the masses. They are warmly welcomed and cherished by the minority masses. With a background of a second-generation slave, Secretary Chu Lin [2612 2651] of the Ganluo County Party Committee who is young and vigorous frequently toured the basic level, such as a production brigade, to learn farming techniques. He enthusiastically led the county cadres to work the farmland scientifically for continued additions to the cultivated acreage of hybrid corn throughout the county for great gains in crop yields.

At present, in order to meet the demand of the four modernization construction at party organization various levels in the autonomous prefecture took further steps for a larger increase of leading positions assigned to minority cadres within 3 to 5 years.

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## PARTY AND STATE

### MAO ZEDONG'S ROLE, EFFECT IN CULTURAL REVOLUTION ANALYZED

Hong Kong QISHI NIANDAI [THE SEVENTIES] in Chinese No 2 Feb 81 p 26-49

[Article by Wang Xizhe [3769 1585 0772]: "Mao Zedong and the Cultural Revolution"]

[Excerpts] "What did Mao Zedong do in the Cultural Revolution? Did he lead China towards disaster or towards glory?"

Some young democrats are asking these questions in China now. In their view, it seems to be like this: No matter how great the disaster Mao Zedong brought on the people by starting the Cultural Revolution, his subjective desires were good ones (this is roughly the same as the explanation by the officials), and his opposition to bureaucratic and special rights thinking and criticism of the proposals of the bourgeois within the party were extremely valuable and must be continued.

Is this really the way it was? The aim of this essay is to probe these questions.

#### I. The Essentials of the Debate in the International Communist Movement.

In the beginning, Mao Zedong, who was called "the greatest Marxist-Leninist of our day" by his best student Lin Biao, appeared not as a leader of Chinese communism, but as a leader of world communism. Therefore, it is necessary first of all to consider him in a world context, and thus consider him in the international communist movement, but in appraising Mao Zedong, many comrades forget this point. Mao Zedong was progressive and conservative, he was revolutionary and reactionary, and if one looks at the answers he gave to the essential questions of the international communist movement debate, one would understand the greater part.

Since the sixties, Mao Zedong issued slogans to the world under the banner of "anti-revisionism", so what is "revisionism"? Just what is the content of this "revisionism"? Mao Zedong tells us that one part is Yugoslavian Titoism and one part is Soviet Khrushchevism. It is self-evident that Mao Zedong was very irritated by the anti-Stalinism of Tito and particularly that of Khrushchev, and that anti-Stalinism is a characteristic feature of Titoism and Khrushchevism.

#### II. China's Reform and Anti-Reform Struggle

From 1956 to 1976, the last 20 years of his life, Mao Zedong was the one responsible for the defense of Stalinism. He decided that it was necessary to protect the idol which had been spurned by the entire world, to save the unsavable. Although this most conservative aim appeared in the most intensive features.

The young democrat Comrade Jin Jun (1900-1971) proposed Mao Zedong, then chairman of the "valuable thought of the later period" of Mao Zedong: "The greatness of Mao Zedong lies in the fact that he adopted a critical attitude towards the country he found personally, attacked the social order which made him chairman and which he should uphold, and that he adopted a critical attitude towards the party of which he was chairman and attacked the party which called him chairman..."

But why did Mao Zedong attack this country and this party? Was it because the Stalinization of this country and this party (it must have provoked sharp conflict between people) made them dissatisfied? No, quite the contrary. It was because within this country and this party a reformist strength which had to be produced was produced and the development of this reformist strength made Mao Zedong extremely suspicious, restless and eager to get rid of it. It was because he disliked the fact that the state and party were insufficiently totalitarian and insufficiently dictatorial so he wanted to smash it and rebuild a proper proletarian dictatorial Mao Dynasty. This is a fact which even a blind man can see, so why can't the young democrat Jin Jun and the other young comrades see this? I know that when Marx discovered someone protecting the unprotectable with the spirit of a hero, the image of Don Quixote appeared to him. But when a similar king of person appears before us, our young people act as though they had seen the god Apollo!

After the victory of the Chinese revolution in 1949, there was really not any great question about what direction China should take. The Seventh Congress of the CCP and the Seventh Meeting of the Second Plenary Session of the Central Committee of the CCP had already determined its line which was to build a new democratic China and make the new democratic political and economic systems have a stable and long development. This path was established in the following analytical fashion:

China was a backward country both economically and culturally, and in such a poor and ignorant country it was impossible to build immediately productive relations of a socialist nature, so it must permit the long-term existence and development of state capitalism with a socialist nature, private or collective capitalism and agricultural cooperative economies. Because economic laws are natural laws, "even if a society found the natural laws of its own movement...it still could not leap over or use legal means to eliminate the natural developmental stage." (Marx).

However, Mao Zedong didn't believe this. He was a chief greater than the three sage kings and more meritorious than the five virtuous emperors. He certainly would work wonders to prove views which were only those of a pedantic scholar. And he certainly would prove this one point: where he was even more wise than the dictatorial monarchs of history was in that he dared to issue orders on the economic conditions of society.

Thus, Mao Zedong, this Hunanese peasant, proposed a great agricultural socialist program which believed that even on the foundation of primitive and crude hand-made tools, and on the foundation of low and ignorant cultural level, it is possible to enter the socialist stage through constantly broadening simple labor combinations, constantly using the laws to promulgate changes in ownership. This program was built on this kind of faith out of the conviction that because of their suffering, the peasants "have a reservoir of extreme socialist enthusiasm." Since even in the peasant masses there was a great reservoir of socialist enthusiasm, if anyone in

the other masses actually exhibited little or none of this enthusiasm, then he certainly could be suspected of counterrevolution; since the mission of the Communist Party is to mobilize the socialist enthusiasm which already exists among the masses, if anyone in the party will not mobilize or even oppose this agricultural socialism, then he certainly must be a right opportunist or a capitalist-roader. Since this agricultural socialism is not a natural tendency in economic development, but the result of human action, the final say must be in the hands of the Communist Party and the final say within the party must be in the hands of the "great leader" Mao Zedong. Clearly, the theory and practice of agricultural socialism is the theoretical and practical foundation of Mao Zedong's autocracy.

The idea of this agricultural socialism and the method of making the country autocratic and the party totalitarian on the foundation of agricultural socialism, in the beginning, within the party, met with criticism and opposition of the Marxists, represented by Liu Shaoqi and the repeated advances and retreats were a reflection of this struggle.

Opposing the new democracy and promoting agricultural socialism was certain to make the country autocratic and the party totalitarian; opposing agricultural socialism and upholding new democracy would certainly make country and party democratic. It was in this atmosphere that the CPSU convened its 20th Congress. Khrushchev exposed and criticized Stalinism, opposed blind faith in the individual and worship of the individual, and preached democratic and collective leadership within the party. This not only was a breath of spring for Liu Shaoqi's group but it was a dousing with ice water for Mao Zedong. At the 8th Congress in 1956, Liu Shaoqi's group made an obvious breakthrough in the question of party reform. With the endorsement of Liu Shaoqi, the stipulation "Mao Zedong thought is the guide for all our work" was deleted from the party constitution, the secretariat system was passed, the practice of Mao Zedong chairing the Central Committee and the Secretariat simultaneously was eliminated, the Secretariat, headed by Deng Xiaoping was directly responsible to the Standing Committee of the Politbureau and no longer responsible to Mao Zedong, and the Politbureau itself was established by the 8th Congress.

The 8th Congress was a great turning point for the Communist Party. It symbolized the beginning of the democratic reform process of the Chinese Communist Party. And although this process was peremptorily interrupted many times by Mao Zedong, in the end it became an irreversible historical direction.

The 20th Congress of the CPSU stirred up a wave of anti-Stalinism in Eastern Europe.

The Hungarian Incident and Tito's speech in Prague incited a zeal for democratic reforms among Chinese intellectuals, particularly young students.

Facing pressure both inside and outside the party from democratic reforms, Mao Zedong decided to counterattack. The counterattack tactic was first of all to draw the snake out of the hole.

The result, as everyone knows, was to crush the "right wing". But what did these people in the "right wing" advocate? It must be admitted that in this group were some reactionaries who demanded the restoration of the old system, but basically speaking, they were just some people dissatisfied with the increasing tendency in the party towards bureaucratism and hoped to realize certain democratic reforms.

They opposed the unity of party and government and the entire undemocratic system under the direct party orders. They thought that this was a violation of the principle of "coalition government". They opposed the peremptory bureaucratic behavior of some basic level party cadres. They opposed high speed cooperativization without regard to practical possibilities. They opposed the USSR's policy of great power chauvinism towards China. They demanded greater democracy and freedom in politics, thought and scholarship. But this was right wing, and in Mao Zedong's view it was treason and heresy.

The power of the 1957 victory quickly became apparent. The attack on the "rightists" outside the party was only Mao Zedong's warning to the "rightists" inside the party. Didn't the "rightists" inside the party want to "oppose rashness"? He warned them that from now on not only would opposition to rashness not be permitted, but that he wanted a "great leap forward". Since you--"rightists" inside the party-- did not dare oppose socialism any more, how could you dare oppose a great leap forward? Since you did not dare oppose a great leap forward, how could you oppose the primary conditions for a great leap forward: "centralize power in one man's hands" and "the party secretary takes command"? As soon as the 8th Session of the 2nd Plenary Session of the Central Committee of the CCP began, the worship of the individual began again.

However, in 1959, Mao Zedong met a serious challenge at Lushan. This struggle had a great impact on the political life of the Chinese people and the Chinese Communist Party. In the winter of 1965, Mao Zedong's cultural revolution which started because of Wu Han's rebellion, was only a continuation of this battle. Thus, understanding this battle is the key to understanding the closeness of Mao Zedong and the Cultural Revolution.

After winning victory over the "rightists" and severely attacking the democratic reform forces inside and outside the party, Mao Zedong thought he could go all out to implement his agricultural socialist program.

Quite clearly, at the 8th Congress in 1956, from the position won on party collective leadership, the democratic reformists within the party could not withstand the attacks of Mao Zedong's personal authority and in the face of this swift and fierce attack they kept on retreating. This was not only because the radiance of eternal correctness given off by Mao Zedong in this revolution was still aglow, but also because Mao Zedong's agricultural socialist program itself came from a fundamental constituent element of the CCP--the peasants. The Chinese peasant, who had never before seen large modernized industry, let alone had the opportunity to be inside one, could not be a vast reservoir of enthusiasm for scientific socialism. When people use socialist and communist ideals to incite the peasantry to revolution, they can only understand communism in the terms of their actual existence: it is a "great Way", a "public" heavenly kingdom on earth. Mao Zedong could bring them such a paradise, so the fanatical worship with which they repaid him can be imagined!

However, the democratic reformists within the party also could not but fight and be routed. The widespread famine and disorder brought on by the "Great Leap Forward" in 1959 also made genuine party members who sympathized with the suffering of the people have to come forward bravely.

In evaluating this struggle, people frequently pay attention only to the struggle of whether or not to accept the "Three Red Banners" which manifested it, while actually it was a struggle of whether or not to worship the individual and whether or not to have democratic collective leadership within the party.

Mao Zedong could tolerate anything, but he definitely could not tolerate challenges to his personal authority. Mao Zedong immediately directed all of his anger over the failure of the Great Leap Forward against the person of Peng Dehuai. In his criticism of Peng Dehuai he was hysterical! Starting with this criticism, Mao Zedong created a Chinese-style method of criticism, which was peremptory and unprincipled. The method was to first of all proclaim the opponent as an opportunist or counterrevolutionary, to proclaim him as a person with no freedom of speech or someone whose speech can only be understood from the negative side, and then to attack without restraint. The superiority of this method of criticism is that it was highly effective, and as a result was always absolutely victorious, its later mastery and use by the likes of Lin Biao, Kang Sheng the gang of four and their "liangxiao" [2733 2400] made it a formal method of official criticism.

Put experience always must be summarized. In January 1962 the 7,000 member National People's Congress was convened. On 27 January, using the excuse of the Hunanese peasants (though he seemed to be a little afraid) Liu Shaoqi evaluated the causes of the 3-year economic crises for the Congress: "three parts natural disaster, seven parts manmade disaster."

But forces are stronger than people. In the face of this challenge, Mao Zedong had to suppress his anger and be meek and subservient. On 30 January, three days after Liu Shaoqi's speech, Mao Zedong gave his famous speech in which he accepted the advantages of democratic centralism, and for the first time clearly admitted that this democratic centralism had binding force on him personally: in the Central Committee and in the Politbureau, he also had to follow the principle that the minority obeys the majority. This was a glorious victory for the reformists in the party for they had once again seized the position which they had won in the "8th Congress" and then lost in the 2nd Session of the 8th Congress.

However, Mao Zedong would certainly counterattack. At the Beidaihe meeting in September 1962, Mao Zedong proposed the "by all means do not forget the class struggle" line, and this line was proposed under the following circumstances:

Because of three years of economic difficulty, social consumer goods were in extremely short supply, "and under conditions of extreme poverty, it is necessary to once again begin the struggle for necessities." This struggle was particularly acute in the countryside. Partly this was that in the integration of government and commune administration, commune and brigade cadres who arrogated all powers to themselves turned property of the collective into their own private property, and turned the peasants into new-type serfs who were attached to them. Conniving with them were many scoundrels, grafters and embezzlers who took more than their share, committee crimes and the new economic policy of the Three Freedoms and One Contract on the one hand revived the rural economy, but on the other it also provided opportunities for engaging in speculation and profiteering and black market business.

Mao Zedong decided to utilize this situation to place the questions which appeared in the countryside, and even in the factories and mines, on the head of his opposition to prove that they were persons in authority who were taking the capitalist road.

Attacking Khrushchevism was a very successful first step. The bad things which Khrushchev did between 1958 and 1960, from interfering in China's policy of armed liberation of Taiwan to tearing up all the economic agreements, made the Chinese party and people harbor sincere hatred and dislike towards him. Since Khrushchev was a rotten egg, everything he did in the Soviet Union was entirely bad, non-Stalinist liberalism, new democratic reform measures in the economy and politics, all were bad things; if anyone implemented similar Khrushchev type reforms in China, he was certainly a bad man and thus must be a Chinese Khrushchev.

Who was China's Khrushchev? Of course it was the reformer faction inside the party represented by Liu Shaoqi. Not only did they implement new economic policies in the countryside and explore Sun Yefang (1327 0396 2455) (called the Chinese Lieberman) -type reform possibilities in the factories and mines, but also greatly relaxed controls on intellectuals and other cultural and artistic activity which had been in force since 1957. If this had not been done, what was more frightening was that they even might try to reverse the verdict on Peng Dehuai.

This possibility existed, for at the 7,000-member People's Congress, Peng Dehuai submitted a petition to have the verdict reverse and the cries among the broad party membership for a reversal of the verdict were also very high. In an attempt to reach a compromise, they reevaluated Peng Dehuai and on the one hand was willing to accept the correctness of his opinions at Lushan, but on the other hand criticized him for his "international background".

The counterattack finally began. The counterattack was touched off by Peng Dehuai. Even today people say, Mao Zedong's motives were good, they were for the people and the nation. There is no basis for this statement. When the nation's future and the interests of the people come in conflict with the interests and authority of the individual, without the slightest hesitation he preferred to lead the nation toward disaster and protect his individual authority. In proof of this point, in 1975-76 we can find evidence, for at that time we discussed it.

In 1963 Mao Zedong almost lost confidence in everyone and had to break the promise he made at Yan'an and mobilized his wife Jiang Qing to get involved in government and had her be his "special agent" in the literary and art world. Jiang Qing didn't disappoint Mao Zedong and within a year or two the literary and art world had collected a large pile of ammunition for Mao Zedong's counterattack, and had rounded up a group of cultural hatchet men. It was at this time they discovered HAI RUI DISMISSED FROM OFFICE and HAI RUI SCOLDS THE EMPEROR written by Wu Han in 1961. The Peng Dehuai case which had been haunting Mao Zedong like a nightmare for a long time made him immediately sense that this was a challenge to him. Clearly, "Peng Dehuai was Hai Rui."

In September 1965 Mao Zedong had proposed to the Central Committee that Wu Han be criticized but received no support. Thus Mao Zedong could no longer use lawful means of struggle within the party to launch an attack. Because after the 7,000-member National People's Congress of 1962 the collective leadership within the party had consolidated its position (the aim of Mao Zedong's attack was to destroy this position), and the political situation within the party already gave Peng Zhen, the secretary in charge of culture and education in the Central Committee Secretariat, the right to refuse to implement Mao Zedong's personal orders to criticize Wu Han. He and the entire secretariat were responsible only to the

Politbureau. Since the Central Committee had not passed Mao Zedong's proposal to criticize Wu Han, Peng Zhen, of course, had the right to refuse to implement it. This was the fruits of the democratic reformists' struggle within the party since the "8th Congress" and the 7,000 member National People's Congress, and Peng Zhen courageously guarded these fruits.

Therefore, Mao Zedong had to turn to Shanghai and deputed Jiang Qing and Yao Wenyuan to jointly conspire in an article criticizing Wu Han's HAI RUI DISMISSED FROM OFFICE. After the article was drafted, to "keep Beijing's secret" they didn't even dare let Premier Zhou Enlai, who was highly respected by the party, see it. On 10 November 1965 CRITICIZING THE NEW HISTORICAL DRAMA "HAI RUI DISMISSED FROM OFFICE" appeared in the Shanghai WEN HUI BAO.

First of all, it was necessary to eliminate Peng Zhen because he clearly was an advance fortress of the position of the Liu Shaoqi group which supported collective leadership of the party.

At the Hangzhou Conference in April 1965, he resourcefully utilized the fact that Liu Shaoqi was far away in Rangoon and Peng Zhen's weakness in stooping to compromise to put the bastion, Peng Zhen, to flight.

Mao Zedong's reactionariness lies in the fact that he was dissatisfied with the degree of autocracy and totalitarianism already achieved by the party and state built on the Stalinist model and demanded greater autocracy and totalitarianism, but the democratic reformists within the party blocked this attempt. This blocking was so serious as to endanger his future as Chairman of the party so he decided to attack the party and smash it and establish a Mao Zedong Fascist Party.

### III. The Cultural Revolution and the Victory of Mao Zedong

When the lightning of November 1976 scorched Jiang, Zhang, Yao and Wang and when the multitudes rejoiced and toasted the collapse of these detestable characters we heard some young people comment: The leftists are defeated, the bureaucrats have won. This nearly became generally accepted among democratic youth at home and abroad. They thought that the indefatigable continuing revolutionary Mao Zedong had achieved recognition in his later years by the Trotskyites and Titoists and believed that the bureaucratism and special rights in such a Stalinist country as China was not only a style, but a system. So what this unique and radical rebel had already gained in spite of himself, became the vested interest of this system's highest representative and he decided to appeal to society to mobilize the people to rise up and smash this bureaucratic system. But he was defeated because his servants could not cope with the strength of the bureaucratic system.

I do not agree with this view. It should be understood that Mao Zedong was definitely not the enemy of the bureaucratic system, and what the facts can prove is that it was just the opposite.

Clearly, in Mao Zedong's view, a system in which several hundred thousand cadres controlled the country's destiny and not six hundred million (now one billion) people themselves, i.e., the bureaucratic system, was a very good system, the appropriate system, and the only thing that demanded attention was that the bureaucrats' workstyle certainly needed checking so they wouldn't run roughshod over the masses.

The Paris Commune principles put forward by Marxism not only oppose a special privilege bureaucratic system, but in essence, in opposing a general bureaucratic system, what should replace it? Only the democratic system of a people's republic.

The bolsheviks were familiar with Marx's theory that the proletarian revolution must smash the old bureaucratic system, but what kind of system did Stalin and Mao Zedong, who proclaimed themselves the inheritors of bolshevism, bring out to replace the old system? They brought out a new bureaucratic system--the communist bureaucratic system!

Of course, everyone understands that this new bureaucratic system was only an unavoidable consequence of the post-October Revolution years of chaos and difficulty and as far as Lenin was concerned, it was bitter fruit which had to be swallowed, however hard it was to do so. But as far as Stalin and Mao Zedong were concerned, it was delightful and sweet ginseng.

We must understand that there were a number of differences between this new bureaucratic system based on state ownership of property and the old bureaucratic system based on private ownership of property, but there is a similarity: under this system the people still cannot control their own destiny. Their destiny is in the hands of the cadres, the destiny of the cadres is in the hands of the state, the destiny of the state is in the hands of the party, and the party, under the best of conditions is also in the hands of a leadership body not universally elected by the party and that Stalin and Mao Zedong did their best to get control of the party in their own hands.

However, while the destiny of the people was in the hands of cadres whom they daily felt secured its existence, conflicts and contradictions between them and the cadres were unavoidable, particularly when Mao Zedong implemented mistaken and extremist policies or when these policies met with defeat and caused universal chaos and poverty, these conflicts became sharper.

As was said above, however, Mao Zedong did not dislike this system, but only was upset that within the party there was always an opposing force which made it impossible for him to manipulate unduly the destiny of the people as he pleased. He wanted to eliminate this opposing force. But where could he find support for his own force? We already know that due to the lawful struggle within the party in 1962, he was already powerless, thus there was no other way except to deceive and use the people. To deceive the people he had to conceal his true intentions and gloss over them. So, Mao Zedong told the people that the opposition was a group of very bad fellows and that they were bureaucrats and that as soon as they had power, the people would suffer oppression and exploitation all over again, and that the best thing to do was overthrow the opposition and let Mao Zedong stay in power for ever. Theoretically, this would put the highest leadership authority of the state and the party in the hands of the "true Marxist". And that there was no other "true Marxist" in China or even all the world except for Mao Zedong!

The masses criticized and denounced the cadres because the cadres were becoming bureaucratized and coming into conflict with the masses, but this bureaucratization was not entirely the doing of individual cadres, but the necessary result of the fact that under Mao Zedong's system of dictatorship, the people were unable to control their own destiny. However, the people were not aware of this point,

and the first of the "crimes" of the cadres they enumerated was that the cadres opposed Mao Zedong (this was really not worthwhile!). This shows that in the last half of 1966, the people's interests in opposing bureaucracy were still the interests of Mao Zedong in developing autocracy and the masses' instinctive demand against the bureaucracy was cloaked by Mao Zedong in the armor of fighting for even great autocracy in the interests of the nation. The slogan "Whoever opposes Mao Zedong will be overthrown" was proposed by Lin Biao and who shouted it the loudest? The people. But who ultimately got beaten with the stick? Again the people!

Let us look again at how step by step Mao Zedong realized his goal. On 16 May 1966 Mao Zedong presented to the entire party the "May 16th communique" and proclaimed this victory in having swept away Peng Zhen the forward bastion of the democratic reformists in the party, and immediately announced that he was establishing a Central Committee Revolutionary Group to take the place of the Central Committee Secretariat which he had disliked and long wanted to eliminate, which in actuality was directly subordinate to him. Although this was a seriously anti-Party act on Mao Zedong's part, once again he could coerce the party central committee to command the entire party and who could investigate?

Fine. Now a Plenary Session of the Central Committee could be convened. After the Beidaihe Conference of 1962, for four full years there had not been a Plenary Session of the Central Committee. What did that matter? If the situation within the party was not favorable for Mao Zedong, he definitely wouldn't want to call a meeting.

But Mao Zedong was not in the slightest bookish, for while this conference gave him a chance for a showdown with his old enemies, he certainly wanted to arrange a surefire deployment. So the 8th Session of the 11th Plenary Session of the Central Committee of the CCP was convened with 38th Army soldiers surrounding the city, and an atmosphere of the glaring of "revolutionary teachers and students."

Mao Zedong finally won victory. He toppled Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping, he finally "legally" secured within the party highest and absolute power, and Lin Biao, his "close comrade in arms" who had rescued him in the party crisis of 1962, he appointed his successor.

In Mao Zedong's view, democracy was only a technique, and if only he could control this tricky technique then he would monopolize everything and, of course, would then monopolize the people. His "democracy" was the people's "democracy" and whatever he wanted to do was what the people wanted to do and anyone who did not approve was then not the people but the enemy of the people. This was Mao Zedong's entire political philosophy.

When he expelled Liu Shaoqi from the party at the illegally expanded 8th Session of the 12th Plenary Session of the Central Committee, clearly there were some people who raised questions about the legality of his authority. He proudly replied: Who gave us authority? It was the workers and the masses of the people. We represented them in overthrowing the enemy of the people, and the people support us.

In this way, Mao Zedong, China's last true emperor, fully confident and insufferably arrogant in the intoxication of victory, marched towards the pinnacle of his power, and towards the most satisfying period in his entire life: the 9th National Congress of the CCP.

#### IV. The Cultural Revolution and Mao Zedong's Defeat

In 1964 Mao Zedong issued a slogan for all the people to learn from the PLA.

This was in complete accord with Mao Zedong's strategic thinking. It was Mao Zedong's ideal for all the workers, peasants and merchants in the country to learn from the soldiers and form a large military camp, and on this basis to implement the military communist system of distribution according to need (distribution according to the need of social rank's simple reproduction). In his famous letter of 7 May 1966 to Lin Biao he further systematized his utopian program since 1958. Of course, this military communist utopia demanded worship of the individual and dictatorship of the individual which was what he needed and loved even more.

Being chairman of the state was such a vexing position! Whenever it was brought up, Mao Zedong couldn't help but think back on that unhappy December 1958. At a time, when his great leap forward policy was already facing failure and he had to implement a policy of retrenchment, he gave up the position of state chairman and very unwillingly handed it over to his opponent Liu Shaoqi, and since in 1955 he had decided to get rid of Liu Shaoqi, the Gao Gang matter had to be dropped.

What to do now? Take on the position of state chairman again? Then his true intention of overthrowing Liu Shaoqi would immediately become obvious to everyone and he would be as good as back in hot water again. Let Lin Biao become state chairman? This would create a new political center and shake the dictatorial position that he established at the 9th Congress. This could not be permitted, and anyway, was Lin Biao really reliable?...

So, Mao Zedong decided not to establish a state chairman. His individual will was the highest law and he had the authority.

But when the interests of Mao Zedong came into conflict with those of Lin Biao and the rising military bureaucrats he represented, all worship of the individual vanished completely, and Lushan once again became a battlefield within the party, but it was different from 1959 because it was no longer a battle between justice and injustice, but between conspiracy and conspiracy. Thus when, after the fact, the people were told that at the 9th Session of the 2nd Plenary Session of the Central Committee of the CCP Lin Biao's anti-Party program was to establish a state chairman, now matter how they tried they couldn't understand how the demand for establishing a state chairman could turn into an anti-Party program.

In 1972, criticism of the extreme "left" had already become an historical high tide of the broad cadres and masses spontaneously striving for self liberation. It was exposure and criticism of the Mao Zedong-Lin Biao reactionary revolution in the Cultural Revolution, and symbolized the reform strength of the CCP and that the Chinese people had already begun to recognize their own interests and begun to support an independent movement for their own interests. While in the past Mao Zedong could arouse thousands of deceived masses to start talking about sending out a punitive crusade, now he could not do this; the people would no longer fight for Mao Zedong, but only for their own interests.

In late 1972, RED FLAG magazine published a series of famous essays which emphasized that the true nature of Lin Biao's line was ultra-right, as a result, Lin Biao's line was an ultra-right opportunist line which "could not get any further to the right".

Then, in the spring of 1973, RENMIN RIBAO organized criticism of Hu Jiwei [5170 4921 0251] and Wang Ruoshui [3769 5387 3055], their crimes being criticizing the ultra "left", and criticizing the ultra "left" was said to be criticizing the Cultural Revolution.

Thus the course of action of all periodicals in the country changed immediately and they began to criticize the "rightist resurgence" of 1972.

Why couldn't Mao Zedong keep his anger under control? Why did he have to organize a counterattack so hurriedly? This can be explained by the fact that after the "September 13" incident, new class relations appeared in Chinese society.

After Lin Biao and his clique fell from power, the question of how to evaluate the Cultural Revolution became more acute. This not only continued to involve the personnel questions of the 4th People's Congress, but also the question of filling the power vacuum left by Lin Biao's clique.

Who would fill it? Of the Mao Zedong clique, which was the victor in the Cultural Revolution, only the Central Cultural Revolutionary Clique and their lackeys still were left. This was a group of upstarts, obsessed with ambition who were trying to seize more power and to draw support from the strength of this power to perpetuate the intraparty and social relationships established after the 9th Congress.

And the losers of the Cultural Revolution, the democratic reformfaction in the party and those socialist bureaucrats who had been repeatedly attacked and were now beginning to raise their heads again with the lessening of oppression. After Liu Shaoqi had lost, Zhou Enlai, who historically was always able to restore party balance and unity every time severe conflicts occurred within the party, became their banner and savior. In the short year or two after 13 September, a large group of old cadres--Deng Xiaoping, Tan Zhenlin [6233 7201 2651], Wu Lanfu [3527 5695 1133], Liao Chengzhi [1675 2110 1807] and Zhao Ziyang [6392 4793 7122]--secured liberation in the concern of Zhou Enlai. So a new political center began to take shape quietly within the party and without Zhou Enlai intending it to.

And the people? The people had long ago begun to be dissatisfied with the oppression from and teasing by Mao Zedong and his clique. The advantages brought to them by the period of the new economic policy of the sixties often made them think back, but the "ignorant fraternal brothers" type schools turned their children into illiterates and hoodlums and this made them angry. They felt that the new leaders with mouths full of rubbish who had come to power had made a mess of the country and that it would be better to have those old leaders who at least had some ability to sustain the views of ordinary people come and take over the work. So, the sympathies of the people had gradually shifted to the side of the old cadres.

And the key to this was Zhou Enlai!

But the conflict did not become white-hot immediately. Zhou Enlai yielded because he understood the significance of a violent head-on conflict with the Jiang-Zhang-Yao "Cultural Revolutionists" who relied on Mao Zedong. With surprising restraint he tolerated the provocations and humiliations of the Zhang Tiesheng [1728 6993 3932], Huang Shi [1806 1597], Peng Qianlin [1364 1987 6999] and Antonioni affairs.

But Jiang, Zhang, Yao and Wang were unwilling to leave the matter at that. They decided to overthrow Zhou Enlai. Under their counterattack, the "10th Congress" seemed to begin well for them: they not only were all elected to the Politbureau, but Wang Hongwen actually took over the position of Lin Biao's successor. Since they have already gone from one victory to another, why should they stop now? Wouldn't it be even better to overthrow Zhou Enlai?

In 1974 the movement to criticize Confucius and Lin Biao began. Mao Zedong was clearly attempting to use criticism of Confucius to reverse the mass spontaneous criticism of the ultra "left", and throw out a "Lin Biao" the people didn't recognize, for criticism to cover up the more direct reason Lin Biao was produced--Mao Zedong's worship of the individual. There is no evidence for the assertion that Mao Zedong's goal in starting the criticism of Confucius was to overthrow Zhou Enlai as soon as the campaign began. Zhou Enlai's base within the party was really too firm, and although the opposition which had been scattered had now regrouped around Zhou Enlai and constituted a menace to Mao Zedong, Mao soberly saw that as long as Zhou Enlai himself had no ambitions (this was proven historically) then as far as Mao Zedong was concerned, the situation was more advantageous than disadvantageous. At its highest level of governance, any autocratic system must have a righteous representative. If it is not the emperor himself, then it must be a worthy minister. Because he was the last hope of the lower strata of the oppressed people and the lower strata officials for protection when they suffered a grievance. If this beacon of righteousness was extinguished, then chaos would befall immediately.

For Deng Xiaoping to emerge would of course require Mao Zedong's agreement. Mao Zedong still seemed to admire Deng Xiaoping and said many nice things about him. But everything depended on Deng Xiaoping's agreement to the precondition "never to reverse a verdict."

In January 1975 the 4th People's Congress convened. Zhou Enlai, who attended in spite of poor health, proposed the inspiring "Four Modernizations" plan. This was already the second time he had proposed this plan: the first time was during the new economic prosperity of 1964. "Modernization" plan was very popular. For ten years people had become tired of the incessant power struggles and social unrest. They looked for a life of quiet and material comfort. The unemployment of thousands of young intellectuals and long period of frozen wages for workers, aggravated the accumulated violent dissatisfaction in society and the fact that the economies of other countries in the world were changing daily made it impossible for China not to change the existing situation and accelerate economic development to suit this new world.

In the face of this urgent social demand, if Deng Xiaoping wanted to lead China's modernization, he would certainly have to come up with a way to do it. It was very clear that if he did come up with a specific method, then just as occurred in the early '60s, there would be a clash with the situation created by Mao Zedong in the cultural revolution. As we have said many times, Mao Zedong would definitely not

permit this. He could tolerate anything, but he could not tolerate a challenge to his personal authority. He would even go so far as to review the situation and issue directives on "the need for stability and unity" and "improve the national economy", but as long as none of this threatened his supreme position. So, as we saw in 1966 and as we will see again and again, he unhesitatingly threw the demand for national rejuvenation and the interests of the people into a pool of blood.

In August 1975, Liu Bing [0491 0393], Deputy Secretary of the Qinghua University Party Committee, driven to the end of his patience by the outrages committed by Chi Qun [6688 5028] and Xie Jingyi [6200 7234 1355] who were trusted followers of Mao Zedong and whom he had appointed to Qinghua, wrote to Mao Zedong requesting that they be dealt with. The letter was supported by Deng Xiaoping and Zhou Rongxin [0712 2837 9315], Minister of Education. Clearly it was the product of Deng Xiaoping's rectification of education.

Mao Zedong immediately seized on this to conduct a counterattack. On 3 November, he replied. Liu Bing's desire to overthrow Chi Qun and Little Xie is directed at me. He pointed out that Liu Bing's letter was not an isolated matter, but a prominent manifestation of the present struggle of two classes, two paths and two lines. He demanded a debate on Liu Bing's letter.

In the past, while people expressed their disgust with the new nobility from Jiang Qing to Chi Qun, they always wanted to believe that Mao Zedong was just as disgusted with these people as they were, but for a variety of reasons, they could continue to do bad things. But now there was no leeway. They wanted to destroy them, but they saw that Mao Zedong himself came forward to declare that he supported these people.

On 8 January 1976, the people's beloved premier Zhou Enlai passed away.

Then they saw to their amazement, Deng Xiaoping, after Premier Zhou's passing the only one who could represent their hopes, and in their view the one who naturally should replace Premier Zhou, suddenly disappear from the political stage.

Since 1949, the people had believed in Mao Zedong. Mao Zedong would bring them happiness, Mao Zedong could give the people rain and sunshine. Even though the people encountered severe disasters, they believed that they could not be Mao Zedong's fault, but simply the fault of Mao Zedong's opponents. But now it was different. The people had seen with their own eyes the entire process of the struggle within the party since September 13, and with their own bodies had experienced what people had represented their interests within the party and what people had damaged their interests. They have even personally compared Deng Xiaoping's program ("Three Great Poisonous Weeds") and that of the "Cultural Revolutionists" and had to know that this was something that happened since the 11th Congress of the CPSU when Stalin was prohibited, and thus something which had never happened in the Chinese Communist Party. Now Mao Zedong wanted to overthrow the Deng Xiaoping they supported and wanted to criticize the program they supported, and now everything became clear! So when Mao Zedong called on them to "criticize Deng", "attack the rightist case-revising wind", the people began to take action. Once again they surged into the streets. The interesting thing is that those who took the lead were the Red Guards of the earlier period. But this time they were no longer struggling to protect Mao Zedong, but to resist him.

We do not plan to give a detailed account of the process of the Tian'an Men Incident. The Tian'an Men Incident was a public opinion poll, a true popular ballot. Well, this is the way the constitution was written so if we want to exercise our people's republic rights, want to express our will, and if the officials will not provide us with the normal channels for expression, then we have the right to use all the forms we recognize as reasonable to express ourselves. But it had already told the world about the real will of China's people, and if the Chinese people suddenly had the right to vote, who would they vote for and who would they vote against? The most profound significance of the 5 April Movement was in that it provided great evidence of the possibility that the Chinese people through a general election might seize their own destiny.

We know that Mao Zedong had always despised electoral systems. We remember that he even thought his election by the people of Beijing as people's representative was just for fun, so he simply refused to attend the 4th People's Congress and refused to assume the position of people's representative. That the man who refused to take his post as people's representative could decide the destiny of the people is Mao Zedong's greatest trick on the people and forceful evidence of Mao Zedong's restoration of the monarchy. Today, people are constantly reminded that Mao Zedong was the founder of the People's Republic of China, but they should not forget that Mao Zedong himself became the strangler of the people's republic. Even if we accept the fact that Mao Zedong was the mother of the people's republic, does the mother who gives birth to the child have the right to strangle the child? In real life, don't we take the fact that the child was strangled as proof of this mother's cruelty?

In the past, every time Mao Zedong's opponents suppressed the Red Guards who had been riled up by Mao Zedong, Mao Zedong stood on the sidelines clapping and taking pleasure in the misfortunes of others: "No one who suppressed the student movement will come to a good end." Now the fire is on his own head, and he had to act like the "Beiyang Warlords".

This was a glorious victory, in one night, hundreds of thousands of opponents were wiped out in Tian'an Men Square, Mao Zedong had been through hundreds of battles and very rarely lost and this was another victory for him. It wasn't a victory of peashooters taking potshots at airplanes, but a victory of clubs and knives against human bodies.

From this time on, Mao Zedong was kept captive in his study in Zhongnanhai. And except for his close relative Mao Yuanxin [3029 6678 2450] no one could get to see him.

#### V. Mao Zedong's Merits and Faults

Are Mao Zedong's merits and faults in a 30 to 70 ratio, a 70 to 30 ratio or a 90 to 10 ratio? Divorced from specific analysis, this is all academic.

We know that Mao Zedong once admitted frankly that in his entire life he had only done two things: one was to have driven the Chiang Kaishek regime onto a bunch of islands, and the other was to have started the Cultural Revolution. This is fact.

We have already analyzed the second event and the first seems not to require any analysis. Seen in this light, clearly Mao Zedong's faults and merits should be half and half, but this may be an oversimplification.

There is no doubt that on the road of the Chinese Communist Party seizing political power, Mao Zedong had some indelibly great achievements, and it will do no harm to recall them briefly:

In the Autumn of 1927 when the first mighty Chinese revolution was ruined by the Stalinist capitulationist line, whether or not the revolution could be saved and how became a critical question.

In his memoirs, Zhang Guotao says that in this critical moment, Mao Zedong displayed surprising courage. He appealed to the communists who persisted in the struggle to go to the countryside and the mountain areas, and he proposed the local revolutionary line of armed independent workers and peasants under the leadership of the Communist Party and used continuing revolutionary war to promote the revolutionary crisis. Facts show that this line successfully saved the Chinese revolution.

During the Anti-Japanese War, Mao Zedong again resisted the Stalinist capitulationist line, gave free rein to strong armed revolutionary troops and with the cooperation of USSR-US allied armies won victory in the Anti-Japanese War.

During the liberation war, Mao Zedong resisted the Stalinist capitulationist line for the third time. His large armies crossed the Yangtze River and won the entire country, but at this time Liu Shaoqi had more of the coloring of Togliatti and Thorez.

Actually, Mao Zedong was a great national hero. He didn't want to sell out the Chinese revolution to Stalin, so he made it into a counter in the scales of Stalinist national foreign policy and this decision to carry out the revolution was invaluable.

However, what must be noted is that Mao Zedong led this revolution victoriously, but it was a peasant revolution. Although it was carried out under the leadership of the Communist Party, in content, it was never more than a peasant revolution. Mao Zedong overthrew the authority of the landlords, but this was something peasants could do, too. Zhu Yuanzhang [2612 0337 3864] did it, Li Zicheng [2621 5261 2052] did it, and Hong Xiuquan [3163 4423 0356] almost did it. So the Jinganshan way was no great creation and if we cross just five peaks we can see the shadow of the camp at Liangshanpo. Where Mao Zedong the scholar was superior to the dogmatists was that the way of the gathering of the righteous at Liangshanpo made a deeper impression on him than the way of seizing the fort and rebelling.

If we consider Mao Zedong as just a peasant leader, then we cannot blame him for anything. Mao Zedong was the greatest and most unique peasant leader in Chinese history, and the reason he later became emperor of China was a natural result of the class necessity of a peasant leader. This is not at all surprising.

But if we consider Mao Zedong as a proper Marxist (as he himself did), as a leader of the proletarian party and the Communist Party the situation is entirely different.

The contribution of a proletarian leader or a Marxist leader is not in how much he did that a peasant leader or bourgeois leader could do, but only in how much he did that a peasant leader could not do.

We are not being overcritical of a Marxist. Any Marxist is active in established social conditions, and cannot create the perfect society immediately (actually, there is no such thing as a perfect society), but since he has political power, the absolute demands that Marxism makes on him, is to explore the forms on which the proletariat relies for liberation, i.e., the forms realized by people's democracy. Their history should be a history of gradually leading the people towards economic prosperity and political democracy. Only this kind of contribution can be considered the meritorious service of a Marxist. So, did Mao Zedong make any of this kind of contribution? No, not at all!

When Broz-Tito passed away, he left the people of Yugoslavia a flourishing, autonomous socialist and workers' democracy; but when Mao Zedong passed away, he left the people of China economic collapse and police terror.

While one can say that the People's Republic of China has made many achievements of which it can be proud, the historical truth is that they were the result of the Chinese people and the democratic reformists within the party overcoming and getting rid of the repeated destruction by Mao Zedong.

Wasn't Mao Zedong a radical socialist? Wasn't the last half of his life a struggle "to walk the socialist road"? But we already know that Mao Zedong's "socialism" was only a reactionary peasant egalitarian utopia, just as we have said, in the process of striving to realize this military dictatorship-type agricultural utopia, didn't Mao Zedong establish his own empire? Some people say that it is only a mistake for a communist leadership to reestablish a monarchy. No, it is a heinous crime!

If the Chinese Communist Party wishes to maintain its reputation as the vanguard of the proletariat, there is no reason for it to continue to consider Mao Zedong its spiritual leader.

However, we also note this fact: in exercising his personal autocracy to overthrow the reformists within the party, Mao Zedong had to incite the masses of the people to attack them and the bureaucratic layer outside their clique. And this resulted in two things: one was that he achieved his aim, but the other was that there was a rift in the centuries old traditional fear of the bureaucracy on the part of the masses of Chinese, particularly the youth. They no longer felt inferior before the bureaucracy and this is a precondition for realizing the spirit of democratic reform. They even dared to consider Chinese social questions beyond the system. The cultural revolution seemed to have created a generation of young people that dared to think and be concerned about national issues independently and dared to accept responsibility.

Now, many of the young democrats value this outcome highly. They feel that this is a positive factor of Mao Zedong and the cultural revolution and undeniable.

But these comrades are wrong.

Mao Zedong's goal in starting the Cultural Revolution was to establish a foundation for an agricultural utopia and an autocratic monarchy with Mao Zedong as emperor, so he wouldn't tolerate the creation of any "pondering generation". "Cancel several hundred million brains" was a characteristic of the Cultural Revolution. Let us think back on the time when the "entire country was red", i.e., when Mao Zedong smashed the opposition within the party. After he established a new bureaucratic political power which swore an oath of loyalty to him, would he have permitted the Red Guards to ponder, question and criticize this political power? No, absolutely not. The fact that the Shanghai Red Revolutionary Committee criticized Zhang Chunqiao and Xu Jingxian and were immediately declared counterrevolutionary by the Central Committee is still vivid in the memories of young Shanghai democrats. Do we still need to be reminded what people Mao Zedong oppressed in the Tian'an Men Incident. Wasn't it just the "pondering generation"?

The rise of the "pondering generation" in China was only a byproduct of Mao Zedong and the Cultural Revolution. But could that revolution produce only reactionary byproducts? Which reaction doesn't produce revolutionary byproducts? The Italians are the Europeans most concerned with politics and the large size of Italian political parties is rare even in the entire West. And why? Specialists tell us that it is because in Italy's mass fascist movement the people developed the habit of participation in political parties. Does this mean that we have to thank Mussolini? Mao Zedong is China's god and gods do not permit mortals to eat the fruits of wisdom.

#### VI. Carry Out the Socialist Democratic Reforms to the End

The collapse of the "gang of four" was not Mao Zedong's final defeat. Mao Zedong's final defeat was at the Eleventh Session of the Third Plenary Session of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party in November 1978. This was a battle between the democratic reformers within the party and Mao Zedong's group. The outcome of this battle gave legal recognition to the violent shaking of Mao Zedong's position as an idol within the party since the Fall of 1976, and vindication of Mao Zedong's most hated enemy for the past thirty years--Liu Shaoqi.

What were the social conditions under which this battle took place?

The victory in the coup of October 1976 was a victory for a temporary united front of various anti-"gang of four" political forces within the party. After the victory, sooner or later there had to be two schisms in this united front. The first was the schism over the question of whether or not China should reform. This schism is marked by the split between the practice faction and the whatever faction. It has already taken place. The second schism is over how far China's reform should go, and this schism hasn't started yet, but there are inklings.

From the perspective of Wang Dongxing's [3076 2639 5281] group, participating in the smashing of the "gang of four" did not mean that they were in any way dissatisfied with Mao Zedong and his policies. After weighing the pros and cons, Wang Dongxing's group stood on the side of Hua Guofeng and Ye Jianying and it was only Jiang Qing's group's aggressive attack on the Central Committee Office in an attempt to gain a legitimate position, that directly threatened his position. Thus, after the "gang of four" was wiped out, in his view, everything in the world should go back to normal. The movement to "criticize Deng" and "oppose the rightist verdict-reversing wind" should still go on, the counterrevolutionaries of the Tian'an

Men Incident should still be sized, none of us who had been confirmed by Chairman Mao could be denied and none of us who had been denied by Chairman Mao could be confirmed. If in certain things they had to permit some changes in the world, such as agreeing to the emergence of Deng Xiaoping, then they had to explain it thus: This is because Chairman Mao had a "correct-benevolent correct evaluation" of Deng long ago.

However, the Hua Guofeng-Deng Xiaoping group, firmly advocated reform because modernization could be realized only with reform, and the support of the people could be secured only with the slogan of modernization.

In spite of the fact that Mao Zedong was in no way agreeable or that he had spent a great deal of energy to stop this day from coming, once again without batting an eyelid, history proved to them its necessity. Now the question Deng Xiaoping faces and must resolve is the very same one Khrushchev had to face and resolve in 1956.

Just like Khrushchev, Deng Xiaoping had to rehabilitate thousands of old cadres, intellectuals and innocent people who had been persecuted by Mao Zedong's autocracy and restore their reputations, otherwise it would be impossible to get society to relax.

Just like Khrushchev, Deng Xiaoping had to smash the Stalinist-Mao Zedong doctrinaire economic system, reforming internally and opening up externally, otherwise it would be impossible to reform the national economic situation rapidly.

Just like Khrushchev, Deng Xiaoping had to emphasize social democracy, the legal system and civilization, otherwise it would be impossible to overcome the crisis of confidence in the Communist Party and socialism which had spread among the people, particularly among intellectuals and young people.

Just like Khrushchev, Deng Xiaoping had to improve the relationships with fraternal parties in the international communist movement which had become deadlocked during the doctrinaire period, otherwise, it would be impossible to secure the wealth of theory and practice to direct and defend their own reform, etc., etc.

However, the first condition for resolving all these questions was that the spirit must be liberated, and the first condition for securing liberation of the spirit, was that blind faith and worship of the individual of Mao Zedong must be eliminated, and to eliminate the blind faith and worship of the individual, the first condition was to prove that Mao Zedong could make mistakes, just as Khrushchev had to prove that Stalin could make mistakes. And in truth, practice is the only standard for testing it.

After so many years, historical fact may be able to provide this kind of distinction for us: Khrushchev's treatment of Stalin was brutal and capricious. Deng Xiaoping's treatment of Mao Zedong was good-natured and circumspect, but this is not the decisive significance, what is significant is that from this point on the Stalin idol and the Mao Zedong idol disappeared from the Soviet Union and China!

"Practice is the sole criterion of truth", this issue which is part of the restoration of the ABCs of Marxism, immediately encountered the fierce counterattack of the whatever faction. We know that their interests relied on maintaining those social relations and they would collapse immediately under an assault from these standards. They kicked up a fuss and opposed "cutting down the banner" for they wanted to protect the "great banner" of Mao Zedong.

The practice faction decided to accept the challenge. Now was the time to feel proud! They decided in this battle to bring the right and wrong of the whole thing to light, and to settle up Mao Zedong's old accounts. Deng Xiaoping hurried back to Beijing from Southeast Asia and immediately took charge of this "Huai-Hai Campaign".

But when the members of the Central Committee engaged in verbal battles and endless debate, even more radical criticism appeared outside the gate of Zhongnan Hai.

The young Chinese democrat movement of 1978-79, marked by the Xidan democracy wall, no matter how you look at it, was a continuation and development of the 5 April Tian'an Men Incident. The mainstay of the movement--the leaders of "Beijing Spring" and "5 April Forum"--where mostly active participants in the Tian'an Men Incident who were called "5 April Heroes". Their movement developed in the process of struggling for the redress of the Tian'an Men Incident. Who suppressed redress of the Tian'an Men Incident? The likes of Wang Dongxing and Wu De. What reason did they have? The Tian'an Men Incident case was decided by Chairman Mao.

The 1976 investigation of counterrevolutionaries involved very household in Beijing. The citizens of Beijing had already developed a hatred for Wang Dongxing and Wu De. After the October Incident, the people had planned to excuse them, but now they were suppressing the redress of the Tian'an Men Incident and the anger of the citizens of Beijing, particularly the young people, unavoidably was vented at once on the whatever faction and unavoidably provoked at once some sentiment for criticizing Mao.

Thus the whatever faction suddenly discovered that it had already got bogged down in general denunciation of public indignation. It could only lose the battle and let the practice faction rehabilitate Mao Zedong's old enemy Peng Dehuai and prepare to rehabilitate Liu Shaoqi, and let the practice faction gradually seize back the fruits of victory won in the "Eighth Congress" which it had lost in the "Ninth Congress". Although they organized another counterattack, it was no use. Thus the reestablishment of the Secretariat of the Central Committee at the Fifth Plenary Session of the Central Committee in February 1980 and the expulsion of the whatever faction from the Politbureau finally announced Mao Zedong's defeat.

The Mao Zedong era in China finally came to an end. What were the features of this era? It maintained the most reactionary and conservative policies couched in extremely revolutionary and radical terms. When the old era ended, the new era began immediately. This is an era which flies the flag of reform and historians are already calling it the era of the "Gangneen [1849-1947] reforms".

At the decisive battle of the Eleventh Session of the Third Plenary Session of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, the reform faction within the party was very well coordinated with the young democrats so that even the whatever

faction and Western commentators suspected it was the result of Mao Zedong type collusion, although they have no evidence to prove this. But no matter what, it definitely was not an attempt by the young people to foment 1966-style rebellion. Beginning with the 5 April Movement, the young people already understood how to use their interests and their courageous participation to influence national events.

With high spirits, Deng Xiaoping warmly welcomed the young democrat movement, told Western reporters "The Chinese people want freedom! Freedom! Freedom!" "We have no right to prevent the people from putting up big character posters."

However, criticism of the young democrat movement very quickly expressed this intention. They not only wanted to criticize the whatever faction, but they also wanted to criticize the Chinese bureaucratic system which had given rise to Mao Zedong and whatever faction autocracy. This made the contradictions between the young democrats and the opportunistic bureaucrats intensify rapidly.

What were the opportunistic bureaucrats all about?

We know that in the international communist movement of the 19th century, there were no professional revolutionaries. The revolutionaries were only revolutionaries in their spare time. This organizational form was suited to the social democratic policy of lawful struggle. At the beginning of this century, to prepare for armed revolution, Lenin proposed the organizational doctrine of a vanguard organized of professional revolutionaries to lead the proletariat and this was without doubt correct. Because there were no professional revolutionaries to contribute their time and energies to revolution, it was impossible to accomplish the large-scale and difficult work of preparing for revolution. But things always have their other side, so the issue was: after victory of the revolution, particularly after the revolution stabilizes, how will society deal with these professional revolutionaries? Lenin passed away before he could deal with this issue, but Lenin clearly thought like Marx did, that these professional revolutionaries should be dismissed or retained by majority decision of the people in a Paris Commune-type general election. They definitely did not have special right to be officials forever just because they had made a contribution to revolution, and if they did, then there is no distinction between communist revolution and peasant revolution.

The unfortunate thing is that under the leadership of the Stalinist road, in Russia and later on in China, these professional revolutionaries turned into life-long professional bureaucrats and continued to reproduce new generations of professional bureaucrats.

However, there are two kinds of communist. One kind of communist is not satisfied with the bureaucratic system and not satisfied with his own bureaucratic position. He feels that this does not conform to the ideology in which he believes--earlier he joined the revolution for this ideology: socialist democracy. He is constantly struggling with bureaucratization of the party, primarily with the autocratization of intraparty relations--and this is the democratic reform faction within the party.

The other kind of communist may be said to represent many communist members. After he first joined the revolution, he probably did not do it to become an official later on. However, after the revolution succeeded, after he had enjoyed the

pleasures of being an official, he was content to go on forever in such a bureaucratic system. He does not have any firm principles and ideology, the life and death and interests of the people have no value in his eyes, his history is the history of the rise or fall and vacillating left or right along with the struggles within the party. He is but an opportunistic bureaucrat.

During the Cultural Revolution, to attack the democratic reform faction within the party, Mao Zedong also attacked them. Thus they hated Mao Zedong, hated the Red Guards and also hated the Jiang Qing upstarts (though once they had the opportunity to, they sought refuge with them). Thus after the "gang of four" fell from power and they were gradually reinstated, by hook or crook they dredged up all the benefits they had lost for the past ten years. Now the young democrat faction dared to criticize the bureaucratic system and this had to annoy them, so they demanded that the young democrat faction be attacked.

However, questions also occurred on the young democrat faction. Some young people had not conscientiously considered the real reasons why that had created this disaster in China. They blamed the irrationality of Marxism itself. The tears of petty bourgeois sentimentality moved them and they demanded that overnight the Communist Party carry out their ideal comprehensive reform. If the Communist Party would not do this, they would overthrow it. The great many social questions left by the Mao Zedong era provided them with soil for their adventurist activity. Thus the expansion of national young democratic activity increasingly was drowned by disturbances which were divorced from the masses.

Under these circumstances, Deng Xiaoping decided to issue a warning to young people-- he pointed to Wei Jingshen who had been severely criticized just as Novotny had charged the young writer Benes of selling intelligence to condemn the expansion of "Black Spring" (although, in terms of actors, Deng Xiaoping should have been Dubcek.)

We do not agree to blame Deng Xiaoping generally, but feel that the Wei Jingshen case was an act of being punished for what one said. Because the question was in whether or not one could condemn the development of a situation this way. After a long period of autocratic control, what kind of social situation would be created if the flood gates were opened? Most historical and actual experience tells us that the violent social upheaval brought on by overly radical reform often pushes the people towards the opposite of the reform, thus this is exactly the way that the extreme "left" can usually form an alliance with the right.

But Deng Xiaoping's obvious mistake was that he had not made a conscientious analysis of the young democrat faction. He used the disdainful term "those democracy wall people" to include those who had actively participated in the young democrat movement. He seemed to forget that it was the majority of them who had shouted and bled for him during those dark days. To get rid of the "Four Greats", he said, "the Four Greats have never played a positive role." This offended the young people and even made many of them once again think fondly of Mao Zedong! "Oh, Cultural Revolution, unforgettable Cultural Revolution! Then the young people had the Four Greats Rights and had the right to attack bureaucratic special privilege, and now all is gone!" If the French peasant's thinking of Napoleon because of the land create the conditions for Louis Bonaparte's restoration, can the young people today thinking of Mao Zedong because of the loss of the "Four Great Rights" not create the conditions for the restoration of the "gang of four"? Deng Xiaoping lost the support

of the pondering generation, and still may not have felt how great this loss is, but someday he will, because standing behind him is an antagonistic force which is capable of threatening his reform plans, and that is the opportunistic bureaucrats with whom we are already familiar.

If we say the program of the "whatever faction" "prevents the Cultural Revolution" the program of the bureaucratic faction will "return to before the Cultural Revolution". They do not need any reform, they need only stable conditions to go on being officials. Before the Cultural Revolution, they had stable conditions to be officials. They never felt any threat then.

How could there be any threats? The tree of the Chinese bureaucratic system grows in social soil that is closed, rigid, and stagnant. This is its paradise!

But there is no way now that China can basically continue to exercise this closed policy. It can only develop by opening up to the world. If the propeller of the Chinese ship is still but a bureaucratic machine, it will just sink in the waves of world competition. Corruption of the bureaucratic machine has already been exposed all over China! Its extreme wastefulness and inefficiency, the striking ignorance and irresponsibility of its officials, has been proven for the past three years. This machine cannot spur millions in foreign capital to rapidly create new productive forces. This is extremely dangerous. Nevertheless, it is just this extreme that breeds the crisis of the national economy. Khrushchev's political fate was crushed in the cogs of such a bureaucratic machine. Khrushchev was a crude and willful fellow. He "reformed" this and "reformed" that, but he did not dare reform the bureaucratic machine itself. It is almost as if none of the reforms of nations of the East can reach the "second stage."

What to do? Retreat? Retreat to a closed policy was the hope of the opportunistic bureaucrats; continuing to advance, thoroughly reforming the bureaucratic system and scaling the glorious peak of the four modernizations was the hope of the people. What does retreat mean? It means the failure of the four modernizations and the end of the political fate of the democratic reform faction within the party. The "whatever faction" is just waiting for this day to arrive.

Faced with the violent demand of the people, the Party Central Committee (now controlled by the reform faction) has already taken the first step towards reforming the bureaucratic system. Getting rid of the life-long system, implementing the electoral system and retirement system, promoting the representative assembly of staff and workers shook the position of the opportunistic bureaucrats right away, and the questioning of Bao Gang [1405 6921] and the trial of "Number 2 Bohai" could not but make them feel panic and they were already preparing for the funeral. Now just before leaving the stage their grab for some popularity showed their spiritual apprehension and their suppression of democratic campaigns in various areas further showed their hatred for democratic reform. All this intensified their contradiction with the people and accelerated their defeat. Their behavior towards the people already proves that they had no value to exist any longer.

However, their deeply rooted strength could make them unite to defend their own interests and this defense certainly could have a sacred coloring. When the practice faction toppled the whatever faction from power, the opportunistic bureaucrats had

not helped because it still did not affect their personal interests, so they wouldn't care if 99 percent of Mao Zedong's policies were tossed out. But now if you were about to invade their positions and special privileges they would immediately declare themselves the whatever faction and would defend the "great banner of Mao Zedong".

What is surprising is that if the reforms faction within the party had not dared to subject the lessons of the present and the past 20 year history of the CPSU, particularly the Khrushchev reforms and their failure, to seeking truth from facts and scientific appraisal, there would have come a day when they would have been forced into a passive position in the face of condemnations by the whatever faction and opportunistic bureaucrats for "Chinese Khrushchevism".

This struggle has not yet ended, but it will. Mao Zedong said, "The trees want to be quiet but the wind will not stop." The class struggle does not revolve around man's will, as he said so correctly.

When this great struggle ends, we will see the democratic reform faction and the young democrat faction within the party and the intellectuals join hands with the masses.

16 Oct - 13 Nov 1980

Postscript:

Comrade Jin Jun [2516 0689]:

I have finally repaid my debt. I have owed this debt for a year now. After I received your famous letter to me "Mao Zedong's Valuable Thought of His Later Years", at the end of last year, I had planned to write something but I put it off until now.

No, I should say that I have owed this debt not only for a year. In 1969, when the crest of the Cultural Revolution had already passed and society had become calm again, I often recalled with some pain the fellows who had fallen at my side one by one. Who were we fighting for and who were we dying for? At the time, I thought the cause and effect of the Cultural Revolution ought to be made clear and put in writing, otherwise it would be ingratitude towards the comrades who had died. This was out responsibility. The dead could not have died in vain and now the debt is finally paid.

"Where is China Going" and "The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution and Our Mission" of the Hunan "Shengwu lian" Yang Xiguang [2799 2569 0342] in 1976 were a great inspiration to me. The Yang Xiguang are the theoretical forerunners of China's "pondering generation". But we are not satisfied with the appraisal they made of the Chinese socio-political situation at that time. This appraisal saw Zhou Enlai as general representative of the conservative faction bureaucrats and Mao Zedong and Lin Biao as radical revolutionaries. This appraisal also influenced the later Wuhan "Bei [0554], Jue [3082], Yang [2799]". But I was not satisfied. I thought it could not explain the facts I was increasingly sensing that the hatred people felt towards the "radical revolutionary" Lin Biao and the Central Committee's

Cultural Revolution, was far greater than the hatred of "capitalist roaders". Quite the contrary, each time they mentioned the past policies of the "capitalist roaders", it was always with pleasure. Thus whenever I mentioned this fact in discussion with a friend and referred to the way the peasants welcomed Zhao Ziyang as an example, my charges encountered bitter criticism and denunciation. This criticism and denunciation were political issues that I had even thought of.

Of course, my charges also had some aura of "opposition to Mao Zedong thought" which at the time any unlucky person had to have. But actually, I was loyal to Mao Zedong. I always wanted to explain him as best as possible. In 1972 I wrote "On the Socialist Democracy and Legal System". At the time, what I knew about Mao Zedong was more than you and the other young democrat faction knew about Mao Zedong now.

However, when the process of the movement made Mao Zedong reveal more and more of the original aims, and the material I came in contact with increasingly proved that my original understanding of Mao Zedong was not correct, I decided to reevaluate my understanding.

The appraisal of Mao Zedong and the appraisal of other historical and contemporary persons in this essay are still held by only a few people among officials and theoreticians and among the people today so I am prepared for great censure and even another misfortune. I thought, isn't it better to hem and haw? Maybe there's less risk that way, but it isn't the fighting style of a Marxist. Engels said, "The more science is without scruples and is fair, the more it conforms to the interests and wishes of the workers." This being the case, I did not want to dodge the issue.

But there were two questions which couldn't be put in the essay, so I saved them for here.

Is my appraisal of the reform faction within the party too high? Some young people think there is not much difference between Deng Xiaoping on the one hand and Mao Zedong and the "gang of four" on the other. They are the formal representatives of the Chinese bureaucratic system, thus hoping they can lead a thorough reform is only a reformist illusion.

It seems I had a little of this reformism. My reformism came out of this kind of analysis: the Chinese Communist Party isn't an ordinary petty bourgeois revolutionary party or a peasant revolutionary party; it is a party which takes Marxism--the ideology of thorough revolution--as its guiding ideology. Today we already see what an enormously decisive role ideology and tradition have in a society, state or political body. Yes, "existence determines consciousness." But existence isn't just existence under economic conditions. It is all social existence, including the sum of existence of ideology's historical tradition. Thus the existence of the Chinese Communist Party moves in this contradictory situation: on the one hand it is a party with a long revolutionary tradition, and this revolutionary tradition has the aim of realizing people's democracy; it is still a party in which Marxism--the ideology of thorough revolution--is the legal ideology. On the other hand, in a centralized state ownership economic system, the cadres of the party almost without exception are in bureaucratic positions. For the Chinese Communist Party, the internal contradictions of this kind of existence constantly become conflicts with

the outside: some of the people in the party uphold the party's revolutionary tradition and ideology and constantly demand change of this unreasonable economic and bureaucratic system, but the other part of the people strives to jettison this revolutionary tradition and ideology in order to suit their bureaucratic positions (for example, Mao Zedong's view of the principles of the Paris Commune as being without political significance, was of this sort.)

However, this kind of centralized state ownership economic system was not the natural product of modernized productive forces but the result of administrative compulsion. Thus it is an ineffective irrational economic system and under the increasingly irresistible attacks of international capital it will certainly collapse. This is because the reform faction within the party has furnished an even more formidable internal reform impulse because this system, seen from the perspective of the party's revolutionary tradition and revolutionary ideology is irrational and even from the perspective of economic results, is also irrational. Furthermore, the reform faction within the party has one great merit and that is, for the past 20 or more years, especially the 10 years of the Cultural Revolution, it has been in an oppressed position throughout, and they have an even more sorrowful experience of the suffering of the grass-roots level of the people and a more profound understanding of the evils of the bureaucratic system. Thus they have a firmer resolve and can get broader mass support than the reform factions of communist nations in general. Thus, under the leadership of the reform faction within the party, it should be possible to carry out rather thorough reforms in China.

Besides, apart from the Communist Party, is there any other organized political force in China which can lead reform? In fact, in all the "socialist nations", not a single reform has not been started by the reform faction of the Communist Party. This is a law. But some perhaps will say, this is a result of the dictatorship of the party and if other political parties were permitted to exist, they might give a good account of themselves too. This is only an assumption. But can a leadership party which is not based on Marxism lead the realization of a reform which conforms to the interests of the majority of the people. If Solzhenitsyn had a party, if Sakharov had a party, if Wei Jingshen had a party, I don't believe they could guide reform.

What is thorough reform? Thorough reform does not depend on whether it can realize an ideal to a certain degree, but on to what degree it can liberate social relations for which there is already the demand and the objective conditions for liberation. The history of bolshevik revolution proves that no matter how intense the initial goals of this revolution, it cannot escape this iron law of history. If it is not done well, then the nations which have been through a bolshevik revolution will be in a greater mess than those improved nations. The Berlin Wall wasn't built by West German Socialist Party, but by the East German Communist Party and we should note this fact.

I have been criticized because my views on the Cultural Revolution have some coloring of petty bourgeois sentimentality, and that I do not understand that the Cultural Revolution was the result of intensified contradictions in Chinese society, thus I do not have the least spirit of historical materialism.

But how much fact did these friends furnish as evidence to substantiate this criticism? They only provide us with this syllogism:

The major premise: Any revolution is the result of the intensification of social contradictions.

The minor premise: The Cultural Revolution was a revolution.

Conclusion: The Cultural Revolution was the result of the intensification of social contradictions.

But how different are the experiences of these "theoreticians" from those of the thousands and thousands of Red Guards who threw themselves into "revolution" at first? Today they say almost in unison that it wasn't the result of experiencing any oppression at first, but the result of being deceived by Mao Zedong.

If students half beat their teachers to death is it the result of the intensification of social contradictions?

Does this mean that students attack the Party Committee because they will not permit study of Mao's writing and cover up rightist bourgeois intellectuals (this is a revision by the reform faction within the party of Mao Zedong's policy of oppressing intellectuals) as the result of the intensification of social contradictions?

Does this mean that the fanatical Red Guards threw onto the bonfire all writings but Mao's selected works and smashed cultural relics, historic monuments and modern art works as the result of the intensification of social contradictions?

Does this mean that the "five red categories" swept away all "forces of evil", and put down the "black seven categories of dog weizi [7614 1311]" as a result of the intensification of social contradictions?

Shutting down newspapers in almost every region is a symbol that the student movement has reached a high tide. But why shut down newspapers? Is it because the bureaucratization of the newspapers oppressed the students? The reason is very simple, it is because they "spread poisonous ideas", "started rumors" and "did not disseminate Mao Zedong thought."

And the working class? Regarded as a spontaneous worker movement, the overwhelming majority of workers stood opposite the students as "old conservatives", and instinctively wanted to protect their own interests.

On 7 Sept 1966 Mao Zedong saw this disadvantageous situation and commented: "Please take a look at this situation. It's the same in Qingdao, Xi'an and Changsha. The workers and peasants have organized against the students and if this goes on it will be impossible to resolve the issue. (Please note: Mao Zedong saw that the worker and peasant movement obstructed the realization of his plans for restoration of the monarchy.) Draft a directive from the Central Committee not to permit this. Then write an editorial exhorting the workers and peasants not to meddle in the student movement."

Our "theoreticians" who have attainments in historical materialism should understand that an "old conservative" worker and peasant movement such as this cannot be stirred up by a few bureaucrats who are malicious and have an animosity towards the people.

So when is the fact that the cultural revolution was a product of the intensification of social contradictions manifested?

Let's go on looking. If the Cultural Revolution is the product of the intensification of social contradictions and Mao Zedong stood on the side of the people who were oppressed by the bureaucrats and had the mercy to deliver them, then it should have been like this: along with the deepening of the movement, the ranks supporting Mao Zedong must have grown stronger. But when we look back at history we see just the opposite. During the first stage, 1966, the Red Guards and a small part of the workers were with Mao Zedong; 1974, the pocket edition of the Cultural Revolution, the Red Guards and almost all the working class ignored Mao Zedong's calls; the third stage, 1976, the "Red Guards" and the workers not only did not obey (note: all of the orders were "precious thought"), but on the contrary, revolted to a man, and why? If we are satisfied with the conclusions of formal logic, how can this specific and complex historical phenomenon be explained?

If we try to understand the Cultural Revolution in another sense, as a Cultural Revolution of the people in opposition to the Cultural Revolution of Mao Zedong, then the Cultural Revolution is the product of the intensification of contradictions in Chinese society. This people's Cultural Revolution began in this way: the new economic and political policies of the reform faction inside the party greatly alleviated the sharp social contradictions created by Mao Zedong's extreme policies of the late fifties in the early sixties (the people still call this period the golden age of the People's Republic of China), and this blocked Mao Zedong's attempt to strengthen and develop Stalinist-type bureaucratic state machinery. Then, in 1966 he deceived and incited a large group of young students who did not have any independent interests in the national economic system to rebel and started a "Red Guard" fascist movement. Thus, only in this way could the most reactionary forces in China's Stalinist-type bureaucratic machinery, represented by Mao Zedong, come into violent conflict with the interests of the Chinese people. Then accompanying Mao Zedong's every victory was the people's knowledge of him made more profound and their resistance made stronger. Through the accumulation of perceptual knowledge from 1966-1971 and through the accumulation of rational knowledge from 1971-1975, finally the people started their own Cultural Revolution on 3 April 1976. This great revolution (you can call it what you will) is still going on. No one could proclaim its beginning and no one can proclaim its conclusion.

On the night of 9 October 1980, when the students of Hunan Normal College in Changsha, petitioning for their democratic rights, came to Su Ming [5685 2494], Associate Dean of the College, with questions, Su Ming angrily replied to the students, "This is the product of the Cultural Revolution." He was mixed up! This wasn't a product of Mao Zedong's Cultural Revolution, but a product of the people's Cultural Revolution. He did not know that until China's Stalinist-type bureaucratic system is replaced by a true people's democratic republic system, this "Cultural Revolution" will never end!

Now some young theoretician friends have written letter after letter to enlighten me, and want me to understand that Mao Zedong was a great (and unashamed) Marxist, and it was that he discovered many bad things about Stalin and wanted to correct them that he started the Cultural Revolution to oppose and prevent revisionism and not to let "socialism at the crossroads" slip into the path of Soviet-style bureaucratic state. I suspect that these young friends' brains are filled with some kind of relics. If they really want to spend their energies on doing some work to search and collect materials and do a little dispassionate research, they wouldn't talk such nonsense.

Best wishes!

Your loyal friend, Xizhe

16 November 1980

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## SOCIOLOGICAL, EDUCATION AND CULTURE

### CHINA BEGINS TO EMPHASIZE DEMOGRAPHY

Hong Kong ZHONGGUO XINWEN in Chinese 17 Nov 80 p 8

[Article: "China Begins To Emphasize Studies on Demography"]

[Text] The state has gradually emphasized demographic problems since China held the first symposium on population theory in 1978. Thus far China has set up 10 demographic institutes (and/or laboratories) in 10 well-known institutions of higher learning.

These 10 higher schools are China People's University, Beijing University, Jilin University, Fudan University, Sichuan University, Zhongshan University, Lanzhou University, Beijing Economics College, Hebei University and Anhui University. The Demography Institute at the China People's University is the center of demographic research in China. The Demography Institute of the Beijing Economics College emphasizes studying urban population problems. The demography institutes at Hebei and Anhui universities specialize in rural population problems while the demography institutes (and/or laboratories) at the Beijing, Jilin, Fudan, Sichuan, Zhongshan and Lanzhou universities are, respectively, the demography research centers for north China, northeast China, east China, southwest China, central south China and northwest China. Thus, there is a demography research network in China.

At present, these demography research organizations have obtained varying research findings. The Demography Institute of the China People's University studied problems of population regulation, relationships between two ways of production, and the relationship between population and economy. The Demography Institute at Fudan University has published more than 10 theses on China's population history and historical population analysis totalling more than 100,000 characters. In addition, some demography publications from foreign countries have been translated.

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